Add Progress, Stability to Policymaking
Author
Caroline Cecot - Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University
Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University
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2
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headshot of Caroline Cecot

The Trump administration’s biggest actions were often deregulatory—rescinding or modifying the prior administration’s recently issued rules. These moves frequently targeted the Obama administration’s flagship environmental protections, including the Clean Power Plan, the Waters of the United States Rule, and its groundbreaking vehicle fuel economy and greenhouse gas standards—all of which, according to their cost-benefit analyses, were expected to provide hundreds of millions of net monetized benefits each year.

Thankfully, in some of these cases, courts blocked the Trump actions, at least in part based on the administration’s shoddy reasoning for moving away from CBA-justified policies. But if the commitment to CBA and what it represents is abandoned, there will be no protection from such regulatory swings in our increasingly polarized society.

At its core, a commitment to CBA is a commitment to evidence-backed policies. The tool is meant to be a neutral aide to decisionmaking, helping highlight moves from the status quo that are net socially beneficial based on available evidence. If there’s no economic or scientific evidence to support a move away from the status quo (in either direction), then CBA will not help justify the move. In such cases, federal agencies could pursue their objectives without CBA’s support—as they often do. But if there is solid evidence to support a move, a CBA will provide a strong justification to an agency advancing such an action. The resulting policy will be more resilient, especially against a future administration with different priorities.

In Trump’s efforts to roll back Obama-era regulations, for example, the new administration was most successful when prior regulations were not supported by relatively complete CBAs, as was the case for the Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands Rule. But it was least successful when prior regulations were strongly CBA-justified, such as fuel economy and greenhouse gas standards.

No one thinks CBA, as currently practiced, is perfect. Given incomplete data and underlying scientific uncertainty, CBAs today cannot produce one number to unequivocally direct policies. Instead, they often point to a range of expected values of different courses of action. And admittedly, benefits to the environment are not always easily converted into the monetary values that make CBA most useful—though great strides have been made in doing this, such as valuing the negative consequences of exposure to particulate matter and the accumulation of greenhouse gases.

Moreover, the effort to monetize benefits has sometimes revealed them to be more valuable than initially thought. Examples include the use of the Value of Statistical Life to assess mortality-risk reductions, the Reagan administration’s decision to pursue a stricter standard for phasing out lead in gasoline, and the value of additional reductions in particulate matter emissions below the cost-blind National Ambient Air Quality Standard. But, most importantly, CBA is still the best available tool for advancing sensible and resilient policies to address our most pressing environmental problems.

Pro-regulatory and anti-regulatory advocates both push for less analysis to impose their preferred policies more easily. They attack CBA simultaneously for being easy to manipulate (by the other side), anti-regulatory or pro-regulatory (as relevant), not transparent, and persistently net costly for some groups—eroding decades of bipartisan consensus around the use of the tool. But they typically fail to acknowledge that their preferred alternatives all perform worse by these same measures.

And, simply put, those who value efforts to protect the environment have more to lose in a regulatory dynamic where policy swings from one administration to the next. Many issues that are particularly important, such as seriously tackling the threat of climate change, involve sustained commitments over a long time horizon in order to realize benefits. The focus should be on fostering commitments to welfare-enhancing policies and generating the necessary evidence to obtain bipartisan buy-in. This work is difficult, no doubt, but necessary.

Biden Off to the Races — With a Boost From the D.C. Circuit
Author
Ethan Shenkman - Arnold & Porter LLP
Arnold & Porter LLP
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2
Ethan Shenkman

“Policy priorities may change from one administration to the next,” the D.C. Circuit pronounced, but the Trump EPA’s “tortured series of misreadings of [the Clean Air Act] cannot unambiguously foreclose the authority Congress conferred.” In a long-awaited ruling, issued just one day before inauguration, the court upheld EPA’s broad authority to address carbon emissions from power plants under Section 111(d) of the act. The opinion will boost the Biden administration’s ambitious climate agenda, which is already underway through a day one executive order.

In 2015, the Obama EPA promulgated the Clean Power Plan as a centerpiece of its efforts to fight climate change. For the first time, EPA wielded its authority to address carbon emissions from coal- and gas-fired power plants, the largest emitting sector in the U.S at the time. The Supreme Court stayed the CPP pending appeal. Yet before any court could rule on the CPP’s merits, the Trump administration took the reigns of power and froze the litigation.

Trump rescinded the CPP, and replaced it with the much narrower Affordable Clean Energy Rule. The ACE rule was itself challenged, and the D.C. Circuit heard an astounding nine hours of argument last September.

On the day before Biden took the oath of office, the D.C. Circuit, in a 147-page opinion by Judges Patricia Millet and Cornelia Pillard, struck down ACE and embraced the legal theories underlying the CPP. But practitioners realize this is not the end of the story. A dissenting opinion was authored by a newcomer to the D.C. Circuit, Judge Justin Walker, whose conservative views may be aligned with a majority of the justices on the Supreme Court. The case was remanded to EPA, which will need to decide next steps in both litigation and the regulatory process.

Meanwhile, Biden wasted no time in coming out of the gates. Moments after inauguration, Biden issued an E.O. titled Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis. The E.O. articulates key principles, including a return to science-based decisionmaking; holding polluters accountable — particularly where minority and low-income communities suffer disproportionate harm; mitigating greenhouse gas emissions; and bolstering resilience to climate change. The E.O. ordered all federal agencies to conduct an immediate, comprehensive review of any regulations and similar actions taken during the past four years. If inconsistent with these principles, the agencies must consider whether to suspend, revise, or rescind them.

Certain high profile regulations are specifically called out. For example, the E.O. directs EPA to decide by September 2021 whether to reconsider the Trump administration’s changes to the New Source Performance Standards governing air emissions from the oil and gas sector. On the same timeframe, EPA must consider proposing new regulations to control methane and volatile organic compounds emissions from existing oil and gas operations, including from the tranmission and storage segments of the industry. Implicit in these instructions is, of course, a directive for EPA to restore its legal authority to regulate methane emissions from oil and gas activities in the first place.

Also called out for rapid-fire review are the Trump administration’s light-duty vehicle fuel efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions standards; energy conservation standards for appliances; and the Mercury and Air Toxics Rule. In addition, recent rules changing the way EPA considers the benefits and costs of air regulations, and placing certain limitations on EPA’s consideration of scientific data, must be reconsidered “as soon as possible,” the E.O. says.

The E.O. gives the secretary of the interior 60 days to conduct a review of whether the boundaries of national monuments diminished by Trump may be restored. It places a temporary moratorium on all oil and gas leasing activities in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. And, consistent with a campaign promise, it revokes the presidential permit for the Keystone XL pipeline.

Finally, the E.O. dismantled several climate-related actions that were adopted by Trump through executive order or guidance. For example, the E.O. rescinds the Council of Environmental Quality’s proposed guidance on assessing GHG emisions in NEPA reviews, and it created a new interagency working group to revitalize the social cost of carbon. The group must publish an interim and then a final metric, so that the economic costs of climate change may be considered in rulemaking, with particular attention to environmental justice and intergenerational equity.

The questions raised by the Biden directives are too numerous to fit this page. What will the new administration decide to keep? What will it revise? What will it simply discard? And what will it create anew? A lengthy and detailed scorecard will be needed just to track developments.

Biden Off to the Races — With a Boost From the D.C. Circuit.

The Summer That Launched an Era
Author
Stephen R. Dujack - Environmental Law Institute
Environmental Law Institute
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4

In a period of less than a month, everything good seemed possible for America. First came the Moon landing, on July 20, 1969. Billions watched out astronauts live from the lunar surface and took pride in humanity’s achievement. In the United States, the concept of collective will to conquer a huge national challenge got a big boost. Project Apollo joined the Manhattan Project as paradigms of government-led Yankee ingenuity licking a technological problem — and on a tight timetable to boot, expenses be damned because of the extreme nature of the threat.

Then, on August 15, “half a million strong,” in Joni Mitchell’s lyric, gathered for the Woodstock Music & Arts Fair, a mega-event never previously attempted and never duplicated in the half century since for its sense of common destiny and generational purpose. In covering her tune a few months later, Crosby Stills & Nash riffed a rejoinder that shows the synchronicity between Apollo and Woodstock: “We are stardust, we are golden. We are billion-year- old carbon. And we got to get ourselves back to the garden.”

Years later, Mitchell lobserved that at the 1969 festival, the kids “saw that they were part of a greater organism.” Indeed, by the time the voting age came down to 18 months later, the Boomers had established themselves as a political force. And while the war in Vietnam continued to divide the country, the can-do spirit of collective action for common good embodied in Project Apollo and Woodstock Nation found a favored outlet with back-to-the-garden environmental lawmaking.

Exploring the Moon “has altered our view of Earth, its ecosystems, and the evolution of a habitable world,” according to David Kring, a geologist at the Lunar and Planetary Institute. “Earth Day’s origins can be traced to the Apollo missions. It is only fitting to recognize the significant contributions lunar exploration has made to better understand planet Earth.”

Analysis of the rocks returned by astronauts as well as photographs of the cratered surface made from orbit led scientists to create the impact theory of extinction on Earth, and even to postulate that the conditions for our biosphere arising in the first place on what was a barren planet were the result of constant hits by large celestial bodies.

Indeed, the lunar rocks proved that Earth’s water, critical to life, was not present on our globe originally but was the later gift of billions of colliding comets, composed of ice and dust, over the eons. The human body is 60 percent comet water and some comet carbon as well, and most of the remaining elements were produced in the center of supernovae near the dawn of the universe. We are indeed, as the astronauts helped prove, made up of stardust and billion-year-old carbon.

Apollo’s greatest gift to human understanding of the Earth’s environment would come three years after the initial landing, when the voyagers returning from the final lunar mission took the first photograph giving a view of our species’ home planet in full phase. The “Big Blue Marble” picture, azure seas and green-brown continents beneath swirling white clouds, went viral, maybe the first such image to do so, appearing on book covers and tote bags with a message that maintaining “the ecology” on Spaceship Earth is like ensuring breathable air is for astronauts.

Meanwhile, back at the time of Apollo 11 and Woodstock, legislators were drafting a law making it the policy of the United States to support Mitchell’s garden, our planetary life-support system, for future generations. “I have come to lose the smog,” she sang, “and I feel myself a cog in somethin’ turning.”

Indeed, in those few weeks in the summer of 1969, it became “the time of man” for all that is harmful about our species’ impact to “turn into butterflies across our nation.”

Notice & Comment represents the opinions of the editor.

Green “Implementation Gap” Costs EU €55 Billion Annually

Failure to effectively implement environmental laws cost the EU economy around €55bn in 2018, according to a new report that quantifies the costs and foregone benefits of not abiding by the environmental targets and rules set out in EU legislation.

The report, authored by engineering consultancy COWI in partnership with environmental consultancy Eunomia, calculates the size of the green policy “implementation gap” in seven key areas: air quality; nature and biodiversity; water; waste; chemicals; industrial emissions and major accident hazards; and horizontal instruments. It does so by measuring the difference between estimates of the environmental status of each area last year and the respective environmental targets EU member states should have met.

The report acknowledges that difficulties quantifying precise costs associated with the implementation gap mean its calculations are only an estimate. But its conclusions are stark and highlight the significant economic impacts that result from the failure to deliver the cleaner air and water and improved environmental performance that member states had promised. The estimated €55bn cost lies in the middle of a broad range of possible totals, running from €29bn to €79bn.

“It is crucial to understand the effects that failing to meet environmental targets has on the EU economy,” said Eunomia lead author Tanzir Chowdhury. The report identifies a range of negative outcomes responsible for this economic impact, including damage to public health, reduced biodiversity, and unrealised market opportunities.

— BusinessGreen

 

"You often hear that reversing climate change will mean fewer jobs, especially for the poor and working. . . .

"But it’s not true. Clean energy — powered by wind, or solar cells, or water — is growing fast, even as the old fossil-fuel industries decline, and generate fewer jobs.

"More than three times as many people are already employed generating electricity from solar and wind than from coal, oil, and gas combined.

— Robert Reich in Salon.com

 

See No Evil Say No Evil

The good news is that fewer Americans are going to die as a result of air pollution. The bad news is that the reduction is due to an accounting trick, not improvements in air quality.

A year go, the Trump EPA “had originally forecast that eliminating [President Obama’s] Clean Power Plan and replacing it with a new measure would have resulted in an additional 1,400 premature deaths per year,” according to the New York Times. Apparently that fact — which professionals will recall embarrassed the White House when it came out at the time the agency announced its replacement rule for greenhouse gas emissions from power plants — is no longer true.

A “new analytical model” in the Times’s wording would adjust how EPA accounts for premature mortality from air pollution. Henceforth, the paper revealed, regulators will assume little benefit in making the air cleaner than legally required, regardless of what the science and economics tell them.

Agency experts promulgating the original rule in the Obama EPA had found significant benefits in lowering greenhouse gas emissions from power plants beyond those due to lower impacts from climate change alone. That is because reducing GHGs from fossil fuels would also result in pushing down emissions of fine particles.

As a cause of heart disease, strokes, and cancer, fine particles are already regulated as a criteria pollutant. The regulatory impact analysis of Trump’s Affordable Clean Energy rule ended up finding higher premature mortality than the rule it would replace because it did not count such “co-benefits” as a policy matter.

William H. Wehrum, EPA’s chief air quality official, told the newspaper that the publication of that number last year was “unfortunate.” The assistant administrator also said, “How in the world can you get $30 or $40 billion of benefit to public health when most of that is attributable to reductions in areas that already meet a health-based standard. That doesn’t make any sense.”

Actually, it makes a lot of sense, because there is no safe level for most air pollutants. “It’s not a hard stop where we can say, ‘Below that, air is safe,’” the Times quotes Jonathan M. Samet, dean of the Colorado School of Public Health and a pulmonary physician. “That would not be supported by the scientific evidence,” Dr. Samet says.

In fact, the Clean Air Act anticipated the need for tightening emissions controls as the result of new science by requiring EPA to revisit health standards every five years. Indeed, as the Times sourced Samet in noting, “The most recent studies showed negative health effects well below” the existing standard for fine particles.

Science’s lack of a safe threshold for most air pollutants means that there will almost always be some benefit in further reductions. In implementing programs that may surpass the health standards, as in the case of co-benefits from GHG reductions by power plants, regulators would usually figure out at what point the total benefits no longer exceed the total costs of the cuts. Not counting co-benefits in such cases is like not counting your employer’s annual IRA match when calculating whether your net worth is sufficient for retirement.

The Times said the change in policy “is the latest example of the Trump administration downgrading the estimates of environmental harm from pollution in regulations.” Meanwhile, the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences announced in March that more than 100,000 Americans die each year from fine particle pollution from human sources. That means that there is still plenty of room for additional benefits from reducing this total, even if you call them co-benefits and they are not legally required.

50 years ago series: The summer that launched an era.

Trump Regulatory Agenda for Next 12 Months Will Be Fast and Furious
Author
Ethan Shenkman - Arnold & Porter
Arnold & Porter
Current Issue
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4
Ethan Shenkman

In late May, the Trump administration issued its “Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions,” a memo providing a rulemaking timeline and scorecard for the next 12 months. Environmental practitioners are paying close attention to see how their clients may be affected. The coming year will be a critical test, as the administration seeks to make good on big ticket commitments, while racing to finalize proposals with sufficient time for its appointees to oversee the inevitable legal battles that will ensue. In viewing this situation, a number of themes emerge.

First, the rollback of climate regulations will continue apace. EPA plans to finalize its substitute for President Obama’s Clean Power Plan. The agency has proposed replacing it with the Affordable Clean Energy rule, which limits the regulation of carbon emissions from existing power plants to improvements that can be accomplished within the “fence line” of facilities. EPA and the Transportation Department will finalize greenhouse gas and fuel economy standards for light-duty vehicles, having proposed to freeze them at 2020 levels through 2026, while preventing California from maintaining more stringent standards under the Clean Air Act’s special waiver provision. EPA also plans to amend the rule on methane emissions from new and modified oil and gas sources.

Second, through rulemaking the agencies will seek to buttress policy changes previously announced in the form of informal memos or guidance. EPA, for example, will propose a rule repealing the longstanding “once in, always in” policy, in which a facility determined to be a “major” source under the Clean Air Act could not be re-categorized as a non-major source. The repeal was first announced in a memo from Assistant Administrator William Wehrum, which faced immediate challenged by NGOs for circumventing notice-and-comment procedures.

Third, while EPA cites 57 actions on the agenda devoted to “alleviating unnecessary regulatory burdens,” not all of them will be deregulatory. The agency is moving ahead with its Cleaner Trucks initiative to decrease NOx emissions in heavy-duty vehicles, and plans to finalize a proposal to establish greenhouse gas emission limits for aircraft. EPA also says it will issue a preliminary notice by the end of the year as to whether per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances should be regulated under the Safe Drinking Water Act.

Fourth, the long-promised Waters of the United States rule, now expected by December, will certainly be making headlines as it redefines jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. The water office also plans to issue a proposed Lead and Copper Rule by July and a rule setting maximum contaminant levels for perchlorate in drinking water by December.

Fifth, developments may be in store for streamlining environmental permitting and review for infrastructure. The White House Council on Environmental Quality is beginning interagency review of its overhaul of the National Environmental Policy Act regulations.

Sixth, the agenda aims fundamentally to change the regulatory process. In May, EPA Administrator Andrew Wheeler sent a memo requiring each of the agency’s media offices to develop reforms that “outline how benefit-cost considerations will be applied in areas that are in need of greater clarity, transparency, and consistency.” Wheeler expects these issues to be addressed through rulemaking.

Practitioners are anxious to see how new approaches to benefit-cost analysis will be reflected in forthcoming regulations. The New York Times reported that the Affordable Clean Energy rule will project fewer benefits from reductions in particulate matter, based on a lower estimated number of additional premature deaths compared to the proposed rule.

EPA insists “there is no new methodology”; rather, it will merely be considering changes to “how much benefit is derived by further reducing ambient levels below the national standards.” Either way, the precedent could have profound implications for future rulemakings, as could the way EPA addresses regulatory “co-benefits” and the social cost of carbon.

Seventh, the agenda seeks to adjust the federal-state relationship. By August, EPA may issue a proposal limiting the timing and scope of state review of major projects under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act. EPA also intends by July to propose a federal permitting program that would apply to coal ash landfill sites in states that have not assumed permitting authority.

The window for accomplishing this ambitious agenda is smaller than one might think. If delay extends judicial review of these initiatives into 2021, a new administration might have the opportunity to reconsider. In addition, under the Congressional Review Act, the next Congress will be able to look back at any regulations issued during the last 60 “legislative days” of the term.

Trump regulatory agenda for next 12 months will be fast and furious.

The Divorce of Environmental Law from Science and the Real World
Author
Craig M. Pease - Vermont Law School Environmental Law Center
Vermont Law School Environmental Law Center
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Craig M. Pease

The Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act are arguably the two most important federal environmental statutes, with the Endangered Species Act perhaps placing third. Since those statutes were enacted in the 1970s, there has been real progress in air, water, and biodiversity; for example, improved air quality in the Los Angeles basin, a notable scarcity of burning rivers, and the comeback of the bald eagle and peregrine falcon.

Yet with each passing decade, environmental law has become increasingly ineffective in addressing our immense remaining environmental problems. I would go so far as to provocatively assert that progress has now entirely halted on our central environmental problems: Atmospheric carbon dioxide continues to increase; runoff from agriculture continues to degrade fresh water and create oceanic dead zones; temperate zone insect biomass has been reduced by a stunning 75 percent over the last several decades, while terrestrial vertebrate biomass is now about 97 percent humans and their domesticated animals.

The sweep and scope of these environmental problems stands in sharp contrast to trends in environmental litigation. In the decades since the CAA, CWA, and ESA were enacted, environmental litigation has become increasingly hyper-technical, even picayune (standing, administrative process, classification of pollution sources, statutory definitions, deadlines). Even worse, that litigation has become ever more specific (particular to a site, species, road, or pollution source, or interpretation of specific statutory language) rather than enunciating general legal principles or protecting the environment broadly. Moreover, these various problems with environmental litigation interact with one another, causing attorneys to face a legal landscape that is frustratingly complex.

All this has caused environmental law to become increasingly divorced from science. Yet that disassociation is not the fundamental problem. Critically, science is but a messenger, the bridge connecting environmental litigation to the environmental problems of the real world that are not getting solved.

I cannot here review nearly half a century of litigation. Rather, I ask the reader to indulge me, and ponder recently decided, pending, or likely future litigation under these environmental statutes. I acknowledge that my readers will have a diversity of perspectives, but note that diversity only buttresses my point that environmental litigation is more and more about less and less. My cartoon summary:

Climate change: What legal constraints does the Trump administration face in attempting to replace the Obama Clean Power Plan? Observe also that the original CPP litigation did not entail challenges to the reality of climate change, nor were otherwise at their core scientific disputes.

Waters of the United States. The Supreme Court itself, in Rapanos, created this legal rats’ nest, with a fractured and incomprehensible opinion that increased legal uncertainty and complexity. Enough said.

Markle Interests v. USFWS. Compare how ESA Supreme Court cases have evolved from TVA v. Hill to this case. Here there are only narrow legal issues (such as statutory definition of “critical habitat”). The litigation concerns a dispute over a mere several thousand acres of dusky frog habitat, with no material broader implications.

Keeping science out of environmental law is not entirely a bad thing. I have long advocated that environmental attorneys preferentially pursue procedural (typically legal) claims rather than substantive claims (often having a science component). Procedural claims typically have a more favorable de novo standard of review, while substantive claims challenging an agency action typically have a more stringent arbitrary and capricious standard of review. Moreover, procedural claims are less costly to litigate, since they do not involve the expense of retaining and preparing an expert. And litigating a procedural claim allows an attorney to explain law rather than science to a judge, and for a judge to make a decision within his or her legal expertise.

Procedural claims are often the most economical path to a substantive result. For example, much dioxin litigation over the last several decades was procedural (missed deadlines and disputes over classification of pollution sources), yet most major sources of dioxin are now controlled.

Yet there is also such a thing as too much law, and not enough science. Environmental litigation now goes off in ever more complex, procedural, nuanced, and tangled legal jungles, wherein the litigation becomes an end to itself, rather than a means to solve real environmental problems.

And so it came to pass that the temperature continued to increase, water quality continued to be degraded, and biodiversity continued to be decimated.

The divorce of environmental law from science and the real world.

Delivering Climate Change Progress
Author
Dan Esty - Yale University
Yale University
Current Issue
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Delivering Climate Change Progress

With all the challenges that humanity faces, there are huge opportunities as well.

Which is not to say that the environmental news isn’t bleak. When the world community met in Bonn last November to advance the Paris Agreement on climate change, Washington signaled it would be leaving the 2015 accord and abandoning the key domestic program for achieving America’s commitment to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 26-28 percent over the next dozen years, the Clean Power Plan to cut power plant emissions. But despite the new administration’s actions, the momentum behind America’s Paris pledge remains strong — and emissions reductions in general continue across the world, as 190-plus other nations move to implement the agreement.

On the downside, we face profound challenges not only at the national level with the new administration, where the pullback from environmental regulation has been well documented, but also at the state level, where budget crises are taking a toll. For example, the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (which I led from 2011 to 2014) faces dramatic budget cuts and staff reductions. And the CT Green Bank, which I helped to launch — bringing Republicans and Democrats together to use limited clean energy resources to leverage private capital — faces budget challenges too.

These pressures require us to pursue our environmental agenda in new and better ways. For instance, one of the most profound points of learning from ecological science over the last fifty years is that we must take a systems approach to environmental problems. Air, water, waste, and land use are all connected. Issues at the global, national, state, and local levels are all connected. Thus, we need to use the current crisis to shape a 21st century policy strategy that is more integrated and better captures the opportunities from systems thinking. 

The logic of connectedness extends to the political domain. Yet, our elected officials appear more deeply divided than ever. Clean energy can move on a bipartisan basis, but it takes hard work, it takes compromise, and it takes doing things in better ways, not simply reiterating the same old arguments that have kept people apart for so very long.

While a systems approach can and should be deployed across the environmental agenda, climate change looms as the central — even existential — challenge of our times, demanding worldwide collaboration and, at the same time, transformative change toward a clean energy future at the local, state, and national levels. As a young EPA official, I helped to negotiate the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change. Maurice Strong, the Canadian diplomat and businessman who chaired the 1992 Rio Earth Summit at which the convention was launched, took me aside and said, “Dan, you’ve got to remember, that when we gather all these presidents and prime ministers, only two outcomes are possible: Success and real success.” Sadly, we have not delivered real success over the ensuing 25 years. Emissions have continued to rise, and we have not transformed the energy foundation for our planet.

The 1992 climate treaty was top-down, reflecting the prevailing wisdom that national governments were the way to deliver transformative change and broad-based outcomes. In contrast, the Paris Agreement shifts toward bottom-up strategies that recognize the reality that presidents and prime ministers don’t actually control most of the decisions that determine the carbon footprints of their societies. Those decisions — about urban development, transportation, housing, and economic activity — fall more directly to mayors, governors, CEOs, university presidents, and the leaders of community organizations. The Paris accord, with its more decentralized structure, reflects the fact that they are the ones who make the actual decisions that will determine whether our society decarbonizes.

The importance of this shift in focus cannot be over-stated. Since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, national governments have been in charge. But what was the right structure to solve the religious wars of Europe in the 17th century might not be right for solving 21st century environmental problems. We are not one nation with one leader in one place. We have a much richer tapestry of political and societal leadership. California Governor Jerry Brown, for instance, leads a sovereign state with great potential to deliver greenhouse gas emissions reductions. Likewise dozens of other governors, mayors, and corporate leaders have committed their states, cities, and companies to climate action — thus keeping momentum behind the Paris Agreement.

I argue that this new broader leadership framework should be formally acknowledged and celebrated. In this regard, I would like to see the Paris Agreement opened to signature by mayors, governors, CEOs, and others who are steering society toward a transformed energy future. This same logic would apply, I might add, to all future global agreements where national governments alone cannot deliver successful outcomes.

More generally the game plan of the 1992 framework convention, reflecting 20th century thinking, centered on targets and timetables for emissions reductions. I call this “the lawyer’s mistake,” since those with legal training often think that if you pass a law, write regulations, sign a treaty, or issue rules, people will follow them. No one in business would have made that mistake. They would regard the treaty as a mission statement or maybe a business plan, but lacking a serious implementation strategy. The Paris Agreement gets beyond this error, shifting people’s focus from mere goals to incentives to deliver solutions — particularly new strategies for financing investments in energy efficiency and renewable power infrastructure. And it moves away from a command-and-control model that demands conformity to a single path forward to an approach that asks each country to say what it can do and how it will do it.

To that end, there is no better incentive to reduce emissions and expand the deployment of wind, solar, and other renewable power sources than to make people pay for the harm they cause — thus steering them toward clean energy options. In this spirit, many countries (and companies — and even universities) have begun to put carbon charges in place. Using price signals stands in contrast with the 20th century strategy of regulatory mandates, which require the government to figure out all the answers — and then tell business what to do. But in the 21st century we face a broad-based problem where everyone’s behavior has to change, not just large businesses but the myriad of small businesses and individuals too.

Another contrast with the 20th century is that we now live in the Information Age and have a variety of Big Data and communications tools that did not exist in the past. We can track harms with much greater precision and simultaneously gauge whether our policy interventions are working. Thus, we have the capacity today to measure performance at the national, state, local, and company scales — and to identify leaders, laggards, and best practices. The Paris Agreement reflects this new data opportunity and calls for a “stocktake”every five years to see if the actions being undertaken are delivering at the pace and scale required to mitigate climate change. 

With the Paris Agreement, I believe we have turned a corner — and the move toward a decarbonized future is now inevitable. But let me tell you the bad news. The pace of change can be affected by political leadership. President Trump’s push to withdraw the Clean Power Plan will have an impact. Likewise, the administration’s budget cuts and other regulatory changes (including the plan to pull back from using a $40-per-ton “social cost of carbon” in regulatory analyses) will slow the shift toward a clean energy future. 

But it will not stop it. Coal is not coming back. Market forces ensure that fact regardless of regulatory changes. And innovation in support of a transformed energy future continues around the world — with or without the United States. While I disagree with much of what the administration is doing, it must be said that the Clean Air Act isn’t the best vehicle for addressing climate change. Simply put, it doesn’t provide a ready way to put a price on emissions. In this regard, I would prefer a carbon charge that begins at $5 per ton of carbon dioxide or equivalent and escalates by $5 every year until the carbon charge reaches $100 a ton at year 20. We know that carbon pricing works. In the Northeast, we already pay a $5-per-ton charge through the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative — and top-tier clean energy results. 

The Clean Power Plan, by contrast, emerged under the old 20th century regulatory model because there was no other possibility available. Congress had signaled that it would not pass comprehensive climate change legislation. So, we ended up with a primitive tool. Within the constraints of the Clean Air Act, the CPP offers considerable flexibility. Each state has been given a target for reducing emissions. Not each power plant, each state. And which states got the hardest assignments? Those who had already done the most. As the commissioner of Connecticut’s Department of Energy and Environmental Protection at the time, I was furious about this structure that assigned the states that had dragged their feet on climate change more lax targets. I then realized the separate standards were politically shrewd. When the challengers from the foot-dragging states go to court, the judges are going to look at them and say, “Really? When other states are already 90 percent decarbonized, why can’t you take the first easy steps?”

While some might see the current political challenges as dire, I think action on climate change will continue apace — even in the United States. For one thing, President Trump is finding out that he cannot erase the CPP with the stroke of a pen. Our law says that once a regulation has been finalized, you have to take it down by the same notice-and-comment process. American administrative law requires that an agency act furthermore in a manner that is neither arbitrary nor capricious. In re-examining the Clean Power Plan, EPA must make a decision based on science and facts. There have to be hearings, citations of relevant studies, and careful review of the administrative record before a judgment can be made that a different policy would better achieve the statutory goals of avoiding emissions that endanger public health and welfare. In addition, Congress and the courts have roles to play. As the administration has already seen, these co-equal branches will not hesitate to act.

Just as governors and mayors are stepping up to the issue of climate change, so too are corporate leaders. In the wake of Trump’s pullback on climate change, the business community has not, by and large, walked back from its commitments to reduce emissions. To the contrary, nearly 2,000 companies have joined the We Are Still In climate coalition. Citizens will also be critical in delivering a sustainable future. People are putting their environmental values into action as consumers — signaling their interest in sustainability by buying green products, such as electric vehicles. Likewise, an ever-wider swath of investors are saying, “I want the companies in my portfolio to align with my values” and therefore are asking for more information on the environmental, social, and governance performance of companies, including details on corporate climate change action plans. I see this trend as continuing, with more and more of us factoring carbon footprints into all kinds of decisions, including how we do our business, how we lead our lives, how we raise our children, and how we engage with our communities.

We have entered an era of sustainability. Not everyone yet recognizes it, but a growing number of people and institutions and businesses have come to accept that we face a sustainability imperative. In this regard, we have to gauge progress not just in terms of economic results but also environmental and social outcomes. Multiple goals that entail inevitable tradeoffs makes policymaking more difficult. With this broader perspective in mind, we can achieve real success on climate change and other challenges, but it will require transformation of our environmental policies — and our politics. TEF

TESTIMONY ❧ No baseball team picks players in 2018 the way it did in 1978. Nor does any business do marketing today the same way it did in decades past. Environmental protection, however, remains stuck in a top-down 20th century regulatory model. But new tools and strategies, including carbon pricing, could unleash a sustainability revolution that drives innovation — and delivers a transformed energy future.

Changing With a Changing Climate
Author
Scott Fulton - Environmental Law Institute
Environmental Law Institute
Current Issue
Issue
1
Scott Fulton

The question of whether climate change is real is making the rounds again. It seems to me that this query has become unfortunate shorthand for three subordinate and fairly distinct questions: (1) Is the climate changing? (2) Are humans driving such change? and (3) If so, what should be done to mitigate the human driver?

While these questions are independently important, the dynamics that surround them are somewhat interactive, particularly with respect to questions 2 and 3. Worries about the response to question 3 can put pressure on the certainty desired for question 2. In other words, the more disruptive that one sees the proposed system for mitigating GHG emissions, the greater the tendency to scrutinize the predicate or justification for that disruption.

We are a big tent at ELI and no doubt have folks with different views on this subject, but personal views notwithstanding, it seems plain from recent developments — from the decision to step back from the Paris Agreement, to the decision to take down the Clean Power Plan — that we have not yet arrived at closure on the dynamic between questions 2 and 3 (at least at the national level). Rightly or wrongly, that debate continues.

Another concern emerges from this. The debate about questions 2 and 3 seems to be serving to gloss over and subordinate to the point of virtual invisibility, question 1: Is the climate changing? This question is fundamentally important in its own right. My suggestion is that there is basis for national consensus on this point in the here and now, and that, even as the other debate continues, we should get to that consensus as soon as possible, since we otherwise accrue risk with each passing decision that fails to account for the change that is already upon us.

There is a new report out that bears a read: “Climate Science: Special Report (2017).” As the product of an interagency process that came out on the Trump administration’s watch, it has attracted a good deal of attention. The report catalogs climate changes over the last 100 years (a nearly 2 degree Fahrenheit increase in temperature), with particular focus on more recent years (the last three of which have been the warmest on record). It describes the consequences of these changes, many of which the authors conclude we are already experiencing.

These are not new revelations, but this report doubles down on some baseline conclusions in a way that should cause us to take note, pointing to well-documented changes in surface, atmospheric, and oceanic temperatures; melting glaciers; diminishing snow cover; shrinking sea ice; rising sea levels; ocean acidification; and increasing atmospheric water vapor. The report associates these changes with coastal zone inundation, changing disease vectors, heavy rainfall, severe storm events, heatwaves, large forest fires, episodic freshwater scarcity, and a variety of other maladies.

The report’s forward look is, no surprise, more worrisome still, as these phenomena are all expected to intensify over the decades ahead. And, while there will always be difficulty attributing particular weather disasters to longer-term climate trends, many see 2017’s monster hurricanes, drought, and forest fires as harbingers or illustrations of what is ahead.

By training, most of us in the ELI community are not climate scientists. But the lawyer’s orientation strikes me as useful here. In the law, except when we are talking about the proof needed to take someone’s liberty from them, we draw conclusions based on the preponderance of the evidence. If the evidence demonstrates that a proposition is more likely than not true, then we take the thing as true in order to resolve the question at issue. If the clear weight of scientific opinion and evidence lines up on one side of a dispute, and if we find that evidence credible, then the weight of evidence determines what is taken as true.

Say what you will about questions 2 and 3, but, with respect to the question of whether climate is changing, we are lurching to a place where awareness of a changing climate is no longer the province of the science community but rather the product of objective, collective experience. Leadership is needed to ensure societal acceptance of this part of the climate reality, and alignment of our decisionmaking processes with it, so that at the very least we are making today’s decisions about where and how to construct our infrastructure, homes, and businesses, how to invest society’s resources, and how to aim our policies and programs, so that our choices are durable, resilient, and geared to the future that we expect and the present that we know. Otherwise, we put unnecessarily at risk the integrity of the decisionmaking processes that are at the heart of effective environmental governance.

Scott Fulton on changing with a changing climate.