<h4><em>Under review</em></h4>
<p>In the United States, environmental law has <a href="#evolution-environmental-law-policy">evolved</a> into a combination of federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and policies. Environmental laws include <a href="#international-environmental-law">international treaties</a> as well as statutory law made by <a href="#role-of-congress">Congress</a><a href="http://live-eli.pantheon.io/#_msocom_3"></a&gt;, <a href="#role-of-states-and-tribes">state legislators, and tribes</a><a href="http://live-eli.pantheon.io/#_msocom_4"></a&gt;, administrative regulations promulgated by state and <a href="#role-of-federal-agencies">federal government agencies</a>, <a href="#local-environmental-law">local ordinances</a> created by municipal bodies and case law created by <a href="#role-of-courts">judges</a> deciding legal disputes. These environmental laws create a complex and interconnected web of rules intended to protect the environment and public health.</p>
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<p>For a discussion of how environmental professionals work, watch a recent ELI seminar on <a href="http://www.eli.org/summer-school-introduction-careers-environmental-law… Introduction to Careers in Environmetnal Law and Policy</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3><a name="evolution-environmental-law-policy"></a>Evolution of Environmental Law and Policy</h3>
<h5>Common Law Origins</h5>
<p>The <a href="#" title="For a thorough discussion of the history of environmental law, see Law of Environmental Protection chs. 1-9.">roots of environmental law</a> in the United States can be found in our common law tradition. Common law is a body of judicially-created law that has developed over time through court decisions issued to resolve lawsuits brought by parties in conflict. The common law system is based on a respect for precedent that requires courts to render new decisions in conformance with past decisions. This respect for prior case law provides consistency and predictability in the law.</p>
<p>Environmental law largely grew from the common law doctrines of public nuisance and the public trust doctrine. <a href="http://www.nuisancelaw.com/learn/historical#ELM&quot; target="_blank">Public nuisance law</a> protects public safety and welfare by placing restrictions on uses of and activities permitted on private land. The public trust doctrine established the cultural and legal understanding that certain natural resources should be reserved for public use and the common welfare. This doctrine has been used to<a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/161/519/case.html&quot; title="Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896)."> ensure access to navigable waters</a> for all citizens, conserve federal lands for uses compatible with the public interest, and to protect wildlife for the public benefit. While both the law of <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131206110455/http://nuisancelaw.com/sites…; target="_blank">public nuisance</a> and the <a href="http://lawschool.unm.edu/nrj/volumes/51/1/35-94.pdf&quot; target="_blank">public trust doctrine</a> are still used as tools in modern environmental litigation, in most areas, early common law doctrines have been supplanted by enforcement efforts under our complex regulatory system of state, federal and local laws passed by legislators. Statutory law passed by legislative bodies usually <a href="#" title="For example, the Supreme Court found that the Clean Air Act displaced federal common law claims for climate change damages in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut: “’[W]hen Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law,’ the Court has explained, ‘the need for such an unusual exercise of law-making by federal courts disappears.’ Milwaukee II, 451 U. S., at 314 (holding that amendments to the Clean Water Act displaced the nuisance claim recognized in Milwaukee I).” See generally AEP. v. Connecticut—Global Warming Litigation and Beyond.">displaces</a> common law.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a discussion of displacement of common law and the use of nuisance in climate change cases, listen to and download materials from the ELI seminar <a href="http://www.eli.org/Seminars/past_event.cfm?eventid=609"><em>American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut</em>: The Next Landmark Supreme Court Climate Case</a>. These issues are also discussed in the following ELR articles: Kevin Gaynor, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/40/10845/challenges-plaintiffs-face-litig… Plaintiffs Face in Litigating Federal Common-Law Climate Change Claims</a>.</p>
<p>A series of cases filed in all 50 states seeks to use the public trust doctrine to force action on climate change, for example. See also <a href="http://www.eli.org/eli-press-books/creative-common-law-strategies-for-p… Common Law Strategies for Protecting the Environment</a> edited by Cliff Rechtschaffen and Denise Antolini for a discussion of innovative ways to use common law to address environmental issues.</p>
</blockquote>
<h5>The Beginnings of Modern Environmental Law</h5>
<p>The origins of our current system of environmental laws can be traced back to the mid-1800s when the federal government first began to take steps to protect, catalogue, and regulate the natural environment. The Department of the Interior was founded in 1849 and tasked with the management of federally owned lands and the creation of geological surveys of the western territories. Yellowstone was established as the <a href="http://www.nps.gov/yell/naturescience/index.htm&quot; target="_blank">first National Park</a> in 1872. The first federal environmental statute, the <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/33/407">Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act</a> was passed in 1899.</p>
<p>Environmental law and policy began to gain momentum under President Theodore Roosevelt. The first <a href="http://www.fws.gov/refuges/">National Wildlife Refuge</a> was established at <a href="http://www.fws.gov/pelicanisland/&quot; target="_blank">Pelican Island, Florida</a> in 1903. The <a href="http://www.doi.gov/whoweare/history.cfm&quot; target="_blank">National Park Service</a> was created within the Dept. of the Interior in 1916. During the Great Depression, a work relief program called the <a href="http://www.ccclegacy.org/&quot; target="_blank">Civilian Conservation Corps</a> provided federal funding for projects focused on conservation and development of federally owned agricultural and park lands. The focus of environmental laws passed during the first century of environmental law focused primarily on the conservation of natural resources.</p>
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<p>For a timeline of environmental protection efforts, see <a href="http://www.factmonster.com/spot/earthdaytimeline.html">http://www.factm…;
<p>A good list of environmental laws organized by date of passage is available here <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_major_U.S._environmental_and_o…; &nbsp;and a history of environmental policy is available here <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_policy_of_the_United_States"…;
</blockquote>
<h5>The Rise of Modern Environmental Law and Policy</h5>
<p>Historically, most pollution control concerns had been left to the states to resolve -- air and water pollution were largely seen as subject to the states’ <a href="#" title="According to Black’s Law Dictionary, police power “is the exercise of the sovereign right of a government to promote order, safety, security, health, morals and general welfare within constitutional limits and is an essential attribute of government.”">police powers</a>. As a result of rapid economic and technology growth, the federal government began to address pollution control after World War II. In 1948, the first federal law addressing water pollution, the <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/33/chapter-26">Federal Water Pollution Control Act</a>, was passed. Then, in 1955, the<a href="http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-69/pdf/STATUTE-69-Pg322.pdf"&gt; Air Pollution Control Act</a><a href="http://live-eli.pantheon.io/#_msocom_21"></a&gt; was passed as the first federal air pollution law. A growing public awareness of pollution’s impact on public health and the environment in the 1960s led to the strengthening of federal pollution control laws in the 1970s, when for the first time the federal government was given the leading role in pollution control.</p>
<p>President Richard Nixon <a href="http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/topics/epa/15c.html&quot; target="_blank">created the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)</a> in 1970 through a <a href="http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/org/origins/reorg.html">Reorganizat… Plan</a>. This signaled a boom in environmental law reform during the1960s -1980s which resulted in passage of the majority of our current federal environmental statutes including <a href="http://live-eli.pantheon.io/keywords/natural-resources#national-environ…;, the <a href="http://www.eli.org/keywords/air-1">Clean Water Act</a>, the <a href="http://www.eli.org/keywords/air-1">Clean Air Act</a>, and <a href="http://www.eli.org/keywords/waste-0#CERCLA">CERCLA</a&gt;, to name a few.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The history of modern environmental policy is told in Richard Lazarus’ “The Making of Environmental Law,” <a href="http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/M/bo3629140.html">…;, and Richard Lazarus and Oliver Houck’s “Environmental Law Stories,”&nbsp;<a href="http://store.westacademic.com/s.nl/it.A/id.1789/.f">http://store.westac…;
</blockquote>
<h3><a name="role-of-congress"></a>The Role of Congress</h3>
<p>The U.S. Constitution does not directly empower Congress to govern environmental issues. Congress’s authority to enact laws regulating the environment instead derives primarily from the Commerce Clause, found in Article I § 8 of the <a href="#" title="The Congress shall have Power …To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes…">U.S. Constitution</a>. The Commerce Clause reserves to the federal government the right to regulate interstate commerce – or commerce between states. There is a constant tension between state and federal power when Congress uses its authority under the Commerce Clause. Cases testing the definition of interstate commerce and exploring the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20080705051224/http://www.endangeredlaws.or… of federal power under the Commerce Clause</a> have been extensively litigated throughout our history continuing up to the present day. For example, the extent of federal power over surface water pollution is currently in dispute and quite unclear. Similarly, several cases have addressed whether the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) can govern species found only in one place, although all courts to date have found that it can.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The evolving understanding of the limit of federal jurisdiction over water pollution is putting wetlands and other valuable resources at risk, according to an <a href="http://www.elistore.org/reports_detail.asp?ID=11416&amp;topic=Wetlands"… report</a>. The interplay between the Clean Water Act and the Constitution is discussed in Robin Kundis Craig, <a href="http://www.eli.org/eli-press-books/clean-water-act-and-the-constitution… Clean Water Act and the Constitution, 2d ed</a>. For a discussion of the seminal Rapanos decision, see William Want, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/36/10214/us-supreme-court-review-rapanos-…. Supreme Court Review of “Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers”: Implications for Wetlands and Interstate Commerce</a>&nbsp; and Calvert Chipchase, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/33/10775/clean-water-act-whats-commerce-g… Clean Water Act: What’s Commerce Got to Do With It</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In addition to its power under the Commerce Clause, Congress also has authority over environmental law and policy through its constitutional <a href="#" title="The Congress shall have Power … to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States…">spending</a> and <a href="#" title="[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur….">treaty</a> powers. In the division of powers between the three branches of the federal government, Congress holds the power of the purse. Using this power, Congress can offer states incentives to enact environmentally friendly provisions and <a href="#" title="The Supreme Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius No. 11-393 (June 28, 2012) calls into question the scope of Congress’ power to withhold existing funding to states.">withhold funding</a> when states act in environmentally irresponsible ways. The federal government can also regulate migratory species and other environmental issues using its exclusive right under the Constitution to enter international treaties.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a discussion of the current state of Commerce Clause and spending powers jurisprudence in relation to environmental law, as well as a discussion of Congress’ power to withhold funding from the states, listen to a recent ELI teleconference <a href="http://www.eli.org/Seminars/past_event.cfm?eventid=660">What Does the Healthcare Ruling Mean for Environmental Law</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3><a name="role-of-federal-agencies"></a>The Role of Federal Agencies</h3>
<p>Federal agencies are responsible for implementing and enforcing federal environmental laws. The <a href="http://www.epa.gov">EPA</a&gt; is responsible for the preponderance of federal environmental regulatory and enforcement activities. The Department of the Interior implements and enforces most natural resource laws, while the Departments of <a href="http://www.commerce.gov/">Commerce</a&gt;, <a href="http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome">Agriculture </a>and <a href="http://www.justice.gov/">Justice </a>and the<a href="http://www.usace.army.mil/"&gt; Army Corps of Engineers</a><a href="http://live-eli.pantheon.io/#_msocom_29"></a&gt; also play important roles.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a discussion of administrative law generally, see <a href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/administrative_law&quot; target="_blank">http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/administrative_law</a&gt;. For a discussion of how to research administrative law generally, see <a href="http://www.loc.gov/law/help/administrative.php&quot; target="_blank">http://www.loc.gov/law/help/administrative.php</a>.</p&gt;
</blockquote>
<p>The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) created the <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/&quot; target="_blank">Council on Environmental Quality</a> (CEQ). The CEQ is the first and only cabinet-level council of environmental advisors to the President. The CEQ is responsible for promulgating regulations under NEPA and mediating disputes between agencies regarding the sufficiency of NEPA compliance efforts and other environmental matters.</p>
<p>When empowered to implement a statute, agencies promulgate regulations, which appear in the <a href="http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collectionCfr.action?collectionCode=CFR…; target="_blank">Code of Federal Regulations</a>. In addition to promulgating regulations, federal agencies are responsible for enforcement of environmental laws using civil enforcement, criminal enforcement, and compliance assurance activities.</p>
<p>The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is an important procedural statute that helps to enforce environmental laws and regulations. The <a href="http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/apa.html&quot; target="_blank">APA</a> establishes the procedural framework for agencies to make decisions, such as provisions requiring agencies to seek public comment during the decision-making process. The APA also establishes a framework for <a href="#role-of-courts">judicial review</a> over agency actions. For example, after an agency has promulgated a regulation, persons affected by the regulation can seek judicial review to ensure the agency’s rules are consistent with the law and are not arbitrary or capricious.</p>
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<p>The process for an agency to promulgate a rule or regulation can be quite complex and can involve many layers of review within the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches. A Congressional Research Service report provides a good overview of this process here. <a href="http://www.thecre.com/pdf/20120422_RL32240.pdf&quot; target="_blank">http://www.thecre.com/pdf/20120422_RL32240.pdf</a&gt;. Another CRS report addresses the rulemaking process and judicial review here <a href="http://www.wise-intern.org/orientation/documents/CRSrulemakingCB.pdf&qu…; target="_blank">http://www.wise-intern.org/orientation/documents/CRSrulemakingCB.pdf</a…;
<p>A key component in administrative law is the requirement that agencies propose actions for public notice and comment and respond to the comments before taking final action. This helps to ensure that agencies take well-informed actions and that the public’s views are taken into account. An excellent guide to commenting on agency actions is available in Elizabeth Mullins, <a href="http://www.eli.org/eli-press-books/art-of-commenting%3A-how-to-influenc… Art of Commenting: How to Influence Agency Actions with Effective Comments</a>. For a discussion of the important role the National Environmental Policy Act has played in ensuring citizen involvement in government decisionmaking, see <a href="http://www.elistore.org/reports_detail.asp?ID=11405&amp;topic=NEPA">NEPA Success Stories: Celebrating 40 Years of Transparency and Open Government</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3><a name="role-of-courts"></a>The Role of Courts</h3>
<p>Where congressional legislation and agency regulation end, litigation in the courts begins. When a case is filed alleging a violation of a federal environmental law, it usually is filed in the district court located where the alleged violation occurred. In some environmental lawsuits, called “<a href="http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/Fed…; target="_blank">judicial review</a>,” disagreement is over whether federal regulations are consistent with statutory requirements and whether federal agencies are acting within the limits of the law. To resolve these conflicts, interested parties such as NGOs, corporate interests, and private individuals file lawsuits in federal court. In such cases, initial review of the agency action often begins directly at the appellate level in the <a href="http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf//content/home+page#&quot; target="_blank">United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit</a><a href="http://live-eli.pantheon.io/#_msocom_35"></a&gt;. As a result, the D.C. Circuit is one of the busiest, and arguably most influential, federal appellate courts in the country on environmental regulatory matters.</p>
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<p>A good overview of the federal court system is provided here <a href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/federal_courts&quot; target="_blank">http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/federal_courts</a>.</p&gt;
<p>Judge Douglas Ginsburg, a long-time judge on the D.C. Circuit, describes the court’s role in administrative law in a 2011 speech here <a href="https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/law-journals/gjlpp/upload/zs80…;
</blockquote>
<h5><a name="standing"></a>Standing to Sue</h5>
<p>Before a case will be heard in court, a plaintiff must demonstrate <a href="http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title4/civ0003… to sue</a>. This is because Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to actual “cases or controversies” that arise between adverse parties. The U.S. Supreme Court has outlined three requirements that must be met by a petitioner to establish Article III standing: (1) injury directly suffered by the petitioner (2) that is caused by the conduct petitioner complained of and (3) that is redressable by a favorable court decision. This seemingly straightforward standing test has become a contentious issue in environmental lawsuits where courts have been faced with the question – who has standing to complain about air pollution or harm to endangered species?</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Two ELI seminars on standing issues, one <a href="http://www.eli.org/events/access-courts-after-massachusetts-v-epa-who-h… and <a href="http://www.eli.org/events/access-courts-after-massachusetts-v-epa-who-w…; the <em>Massachusetts v. EPA</em> decision, offer a discussion of and insights into the standing issues.</p>
<p>To better understand the jurisdiction of federal courts, read this <a href="http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/Jur…; target="_blank">http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/Jur…;
</blockquote>
<h5><a name="citizen-suits"></a>Citizen Suits</h5>
<p>Many federal environmental laws allow concerned citizens to sue and enforce environmental protections by empowering citizens to act as “private attorneys general” to protect natural resources. These “citizen suits” are somewhat unique to environmental laws. For example, under the Clean Water Act, a citizen who enjoys recreational activities in a local river would be able to sue a polluter who is illegally dumping into the river if the local, state or federal agency had not sought to end the dumping. They have been somewhat controversial, with accusations of people suing just to recuperate attorneys fees, but others believe they serve a useful check on agency inaction (See <em>ELR</em> articles <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/33/10704/now-more-ever-environmental-citi…;, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/33/10721/environmental-citizen-suits-thir…;, and <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/16/10162/citizen-suits-defense-perspectiv…; for three different perspectives).</p>
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<p>For an understanding on how to bring citizen suits, see <a href="http://www.eli.org/research-report/citizens-guide-using-federal-environ… Citizen’s Guide to Using Federal Environmental Laws to Secure Environmental Justice</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3><a name="role-of-states-and-tribes"></a>The Role of the States and Tribes</h3>
<p>States remain primarily responsible for implementing pollution control requirements. In establishing the EPA and passing the new federal environmental protection statutes, Congress relied on the model of cooperative <a href="http://www.cliffsnotes.com/more-subjects/american-government/federalism…; title="See this page for a discussion of types of federalism.">federalism</a>. Under cooperative federalism, states are asked to implement and enforce federal laws while retaining the power to create laws more stringent than federal laws. The vast majority of federal environmental laws are thus implemented by the states. The same is largely true with Indian tribes, who remain sovereign over their lands.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a discussion of the role of Native American tribes in environmental enforcement, see David Coursen, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/23/10579/tribes-states-indian-tribal-auth… as States: Indian Tribal Authority to Regulate and Enforce Environmental Law and Regulations</a>, Joe Stuckey, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/31/11198/tribal-nations-environmentally-m… Nations: Environmentally More Sovereign than States</a>, and &nbsp;Jane Kloeckner, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/42/10057/hold-tribal-sovereignty-establis… On to Tribal Sovereignty: Establishing Tribal Pesticide Programs That Recognize Inherent Tribal Authority and Promote Federal-Tribal Partnerships</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>An example of cooperative federalism can be seen in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). RCRA governs solid and hazardous wastes. The EPA issues federal regulations under RCRA. States can establish their own waste statutes and regulatory schemes based upon RCRA’s requirements. If EPA finds these state regulatory efforts to be consistent with the federal requirements, then state agencies are given approval to implement and enforce RCRA and state agency action “has the same force and effect” as <a href="#" title="42 U.S.C. § 6926(d)">EPA action</a>.</p>
<p>Cooperative federalism can also be more deferential to state authority. The <a href="http://elr.info/legislative/federal-laws/surface-mining-control-and-rec… Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977</a> (SMCRA) establishes a federal framework that regulates mining activities in the absence of state regulations. A state may avoid the federal requirements entirely by establishing its own laws to substitute for SMCRA’s requirements.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a discussion of federalism and how it operates in environmental law, see Douglas Kendall, <a href="http://www.eli.org/eli-press/redefining-federalism-listening-states-sha… Federalism</a>. For an interesting article on cooperative federalism in both the pollution control and natural resource realms, see Robert Fischman, <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=824385">Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In general, federal environmental laws create minimum standards. They do not prevent the states from enacting more stringent environmental protections. For example, <a href="http://www.arb.ca.gov/research/aaqs/caaqs/caaqs.htm&quot; target="_blank">California has adopted air quality standards</a> for ozone and particulate matter that are more protective than the federal standards under the Clean Air Act and has a <a href="http://www.dtsc.ca.gov/&quot; target="_blank">chemical regulatory system</a> that is broader in scope than the federal program.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>See the ELI Research Report <a href="http://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/d7-07.pdf">Federal Regulations and State Flexibility in Environmental Standard Setting</a> for a discussion of how states can be more nimble than the federal government in implementing environmental law.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Additionally, many state legislatures have adopted state laws modeled after federal laws such as NEPA. In California, the <a href="http://ceres.ca.gov/ceqa/&quot; target="_blank">California Environmental Quality Act</a><a href="http://live-eli.pantheon.io/#_msocom_43"&gt; </a>(CEQA) was based on NEPA, but its focus is on ensuring that state, rather than federal, government agencies take environmental impacts into account prior to taking action. In New York, the <a href="http://www.dec.ny.gov/permits/6208.html&quot; target="_blank">State Environmental Quality Review</a> (SEQR) law serves the same purpose.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The differences between federal and state court systems are discussed here <a href="http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/Jur…;
</blockquote>
<h3><a name="local-environmental-law"></a>Local Environmental Law</h3>
<p>Local environmental laws are probably the least visible form of environmental law, but at the same time they are some of the laws felt most directly by average citizens, such as <a href="http://www.eli.org/research-report/planning-development-and-sewage-infr… use and planning</a>. Most localities have a zoning code that outlines permissible uses for private land depending on its location. Zoning laws are used to <a href="http://www.eli.org/eli-press-books/smartcode-solution-to-sprawl,-the">g… development</a>, protect areas important to the public interest and to limit unfavorable results of certain land uses.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a fascinating exploration of local environmental law, see John Nolon, <a href="http://www.eli.org/eli-press/new-ground-advent-local-environmental-law"… Ground: the Advent of Local Environmental Law</a> and <a href="http://www.eli.org/eli-press/open-ground-effective-local-strategies-pro… Ground: Effective Local Strategies for Protecting Natural Resources</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In addition to zoning, local governments make infrastructure planning decisions that affect the environment. The new <a href="http://www.smartgrowth.org/&quot; target="_blank">smart growth movement</a> has led to local governments emphasizing development and infrastructure plans that minimize environmental impacts by supporting development of pedestrian and cyclist-friendly communities, privileging public transportation options over highway development and upgrading older less environmentally friendly storm water management infrastructure. Cities have helped spur new environmentally friendly trends and initiatives by passing local ordinances in support of urban agriculture, recycling programs, and creating local funding sources to support green roofs, solar panel installation or preservation of historic buildings. Similarly, many cities are on the front lines of taking action to reduce climate change. Other environmental functions carried out by local governments include managing waste removal and recycling, managing city parks and managing the local water and utility systems.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For an example of how localities can use local ordinances to protect the environment and preserve biodiversity, see James McElfish, <a href="http://www.eli.org/eli-press-books/nature-friendly-ordinances">Nature Friendly Ordinances</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3><a name="international-environmental-law"></a>International Environmental Law</h3>
<p>Many environmental issues are international in nature as they transcend boundaries: some forms of air pollution, like greenhouse gas emissions, international trade in chemicals, international transportation of hazardous wastes, etc. While domestic environmental law in the United States has taken root since the 1960s, so has international environmental law. Several major treaties address <a href="http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/index.php&quot; target="_blank">stratospheric ozone destruction</a>, <a href="http://www.cites.org/&quot; target="_blank">endangered species</a>, <a href="http://www.cbd.int/&quot; target="_blank">biological diversity</a>, <a href="http://www.basel.int/&quot; target="_blank">hazardous waste</a>, <a href="http://www.pic.int/&quot; target="_blank">chemical regulation</a>, and many other important topics.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a good overview of the operation of international environmental law, see this article <a href="http://www.ucar.edu/communications/gcip/m3elaw/m3pdfc1.pdf&quot; target="_blank">http://www.ucar.edu/communications/gcip/m3elaw/m3pdfc1.pdf</a>.</p&gt;
</blockquote>
<p>Most of these negotiations are conducted among nations through the United Nations. The <a href="http://www.unep.org&quot; target="_blank">United Nations Environment Programme</a> and other international bodies have responsibility for environmental issues. Periodically, nations gather to forge a path forward on environmental and sustainable development issues as well.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Ecolex, <a href="http://www.ecolex.org&quot; target="_blank">www.ecolex.org</a&gt;, is a terrific gateway to international treaties and laws. The American Society of International Law also has a helpful overview and research guide here <a href="http://www.asil.org/erg/?page=ienvl&quot; target="_blank">http://www.asil.org/erg/?page=ienvl</a>.</p&gt;
</blockquote>

TSCA Risk Evaluation Approach Foreseeably on House Dems' Agenda
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David P. Clarke - Writer and Editor
Writer and Editor
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David P. Clarke

The 2016 Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act amendments were supposed to fix problems with the decades-old Toxic Substances Control Act. But, two years after enactment, could the U.S. hazardous chemicals regulatory system already be bogging down again in controversies and concerns about ineffective protections?

Chemical manufacturers are lauding EPA’s approach to reviewing the potential risks posed by new chemicals before they are allowed into commerce. But Senator Tom Udall (D-AZ), a key architect of the new law, in October echoed broad environmental community criticisms by calling the Trump administration’s implementation of the statute a “remarkable disaster.”

Assuredly, the new Democratic-majority House will take up this issue because other Democrats share Udall’s and environmental groups’ growing concerns. Critics charge that chemical manufacturers have used a political opening created by anti-regulatory Trump administration officials to drive the agency’s adoption of weak regulatory policies for both new and existing chemicals.

While political considerations are unavoidable in implementing a law, says Richard Denison, the Environmental Defense Fund’s lead senior scientist, EPA’s interpretation has been so one-sided toward industry that the only recourse at present is the courts. In working for passage of the law, EDF had sought a middle ground, joining with industry in agreeing a stronger law was necessary so the public could trust the safety of chemical products.

But that balance “has gone completely to the wayside,” Denison adds, and “confidence in the new system has vanished.” The revised law is strong, but implementation has been “disastrous,” Denison says, expressing extreme disappointment in the way industry has brought its influence to bear at EPA as the agency executes the amendments.

But CEO Cal Dooley of the American Chemistry Council, representing U.S. manufacturers, told an audience last year that the industry is “not deviating in any way” from what it committed to do when working with both Democratic and GOP members of Congress to negotiate support for the law. He characterized the ACC goal as “an intellectually consistent, science-based approach to the implementation of TSCA” and suggested that a “gold standard in scientific risk assessments” being developed at EPA should be expanded to other federal agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration.

According to EDF and other environmentalists who have sued the agency, a “major point of controversy” centers on how EPA evaluates chemical risks and, in turn, regulates them. Specifically, the amended law requires the agency to examine the “conditions of use” of a substance in deciding whether a chemical’s exposures can be deemed safe. Environmentalists view the law as requiring “conditions” to encompass “the whole life cycle” of “reasonably foreseen” exposure points from manufacturing, processing, use, and disposal.

But under its framework for deciding when a chemical is “unlikely to pose risk,” EPA stated that, when evaluating a new chemical, it would only consider the substance’s “intended” uses, as defined in a company’s non-binding premanufacture notice to the agency before starting product creation. Similarly, for existing chemicals, EPA abandoned a proposed rule issued in the final days of the Obama administration that said TSCA required “all conditions of use” — intended, known, and reasonably foreseen — to be considered in chemical risk evaluations. Instead, the final rule asserts broad EPA discretion in defining the conditions it will consider, excluding, for example, the “legacy conditions” of asbestos used in insulation, fire retardancy, and elsewhere because no active manufacturing is occurring for such uses.

To environmentalists, EPA’s focus on evaluating individual uses in isolation from the collective-use conditions lacks legal and scientific legitimacy. But industry applauds the agency’s approach. In August comments on EPA’s first 10 “problem formulation” documents, ACC calls for more explicit guidance on when conditions of use will be in or out of a risk evaluation’s scope, but commends the agency’s initial clear decision to focus on only those conditions that “represent the greatest potential risk.”

“It’s a lot easier to find a chemical to be safe if you divvy up its exposures into small enough pieces and never put them back together again,” Denison says. But EPA has said that its risk evaluations would exclude all releases to the air, water, and in waste disposal facilities based on the fact that the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, and other laws exist. That may be so, but there is a large variation in the extent to which other laws actually regulate their listed chemicals, and TSCA requires the agency to decide after a comprehensive evaluation whether to rely on the other authorities, he adds, deriding the further narrowing of risk evaluations.

TSCA risk evaluation approach foreseeably on Dems' agenda.

As Our Problems Out Race Our Solutions, Humanity Needs a Completely New Strategy
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As Our Problems Out Race Our Solutions, Humanity Needs a Completely New Strategy

On the first Earth Day, in April 1970, Senator Edmund Muskie called for “a total strategy to protect the total environment.” We have had time to pull this off — nearly a half-century after Muskie’s clarion call — but have failed. Yes, gains in environmental quality have happened, but as time has passed, we have witnessed the emergence of global-level, existential threats. These include the thinning ozone layer, the crash of biodiversity, ocean acidity and the demise of top predator fish and coral ecosystems that spawn marine life, sea-level rise and the forced relocation of hundreds of millions of people, and of course the accelerating change in the Earth’s overall climate and the resulting change in weather patterns and spawning of monster storms.

The human race is pushing on or through what the Stockholm Resilience Center has called “planetary boundaries” with a certain reckless abandon even as the governance mechanisms needed to address these threats are under daily assault by anti-state activists and science deniers among the pundit class. The environmentalist Bill McKibben, commenting on last fall’s report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, observed that, “We’re running out of options, and we’re running out of decades.”

Over the past 50 years, society has pinned its hopes on a variety of actors: companies that have moved beyond compliance and embraced sustainability, cities pursuing novel strategies to meet urban environmental challenges, citizens mobilized with new technologies, from blockchains to big data to artificial intelligence. But none of these alone, no matter how well funded or motivated, can solve the environmental challenges we now face. As the IPCC concluded, the changes needed have “no documented historical precedent.”

What follows is a coming together of sorts that focuses on the bricks and mortar of a possible strategy to address our total environment at a time of urgent need. The discussion took place at the ELI-Miriam Hamilton Keare Policy Forum, with a panel of experts drawn from industry, academia, the legal community, and the public sector who discussed a preliminary sketch for a new environmental paradigm presented by ELI’s Scott Fulton and David Rejeski in the September 2018 edition of the Environmental Law Reporter.

Scott Fulton: Our purpose today is to talk about the emergence and convergence of some new and important drivers of environmental behavior and how to harness them and integrate them into a composite that helps us achieve the future that we all want. Two new drivers are private-sector environmental governance systems and technology.

To tee up this conversation, here is the central thinking from an article that our moderator, David Rejeski, and I wrote for the September 2018 edition of the Environmental Law Reporter entitled “A New Environmentalism: The Need for a Total Strategy for Environmental Protection.”

We came up with a chart to encapsulate our analysis. We put a vertical axis to reflect that some of the drivers are top-down in operation and some of them are bottom-up. We added a horizontal axis to reflect that some of the drivers are externally induced while others are internally motivated. That creates four quadrants. Each encapsulates and describes both a driver and a resultant system that emerges.

Working counterclockwise, let’s start at the quadrant in the upper right hand corner. In Quadrant 1, the driver is law and the system is traditional government action. Variations of command-and-control regulation are here.

In Quadrant 2 the driver is risk management and the system is private environmental governance that manages and reduces that risk — whether reputational or financial. This quadrant emerges from what we believe are enduring changes in the business orientation toward the environment. These are changes that derive from the environmental values that we carry into our jobs. These values are strongly reinforced by shareholder initiatives, desires for sustainability, and customer and supply chain demands. Managers increasingly regulate environmental behavior not only of their own operations but also of suppliers.

These values are reinforced by investor and insurer demands that perceive environmental challenges as financial risks. They are also driven by the opportunity to pivot from a risk-reduction orientation to brand enhancement, with green branding offering a marketing distinction. We should note that the accountability system associated with this quadrant is powerful. The levers are market access and access to finance, the very lifeblood of business.

In Quadrant 3, the driver is technology and the system is autonomous monitoring and correction. That includes systems that automatically change in the face of observed phenomena. In our article, we use the example of a sensor-based snowpack monitoring system in the Sierra Nevada. That in turn informs operation of a hydroelectric dam and the distribution of water resources for irrigation and human consumption. With the advent of artificial intelligence and blockchain approaches, it’s reasonable to expect that we’ll see self-monitoring systems proliferating in the future.

In Quadrant 4, the driver is Big Data. The system is a community platform for sharing those data and the stories that they tell. There is a data tsunami coming — we will all be monitoring our local air quality and the water we drink in much the same fashion that many of us monitor our heart rate and other biometrics.

Across these four quadrants, the drivers are going to operate in an interactive way. For example, data-based community pressures can be expected to influence behaviors in both private governance and public governance. Autonomous systems, to the extent that they are well designed and effective, can be expected to reduce the demand for the other three drivers. Effective private governance systems should in theory reduce the need for intervention by public governance mechanisms.

What is emerging will ultimately influence the shape of the governmental role going forward, and that’s ELI’s traditional area of engagement, partly because law-based systems in Quadrant 1 can either be barriers to or enablers of the evolution of the other three quadrants. Work needs to be done to ensure that law provides a supporting system for the changes we value.

But these other quadrants have attributes that relate to and may draw from government experience, in that they are in effect rules-based systems, built on contracts, preferred-sourcing criteria and sustainability criteria — even the social license to operate. The accountability mechanisms, ranging from denial of capital or market access, to product deselection, to public or social media rebuke, are different but nonetheless relatable to government compliance assurance systems.

Our moderator today is David Rejeski, who is the head of the technology initiative at ELI and came to us from the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the White House.

David Rejeski: I’m going to start with Michael Vandenbergh, who is the David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair of Law at Vanderbilt and a leading scholar on private environmental governance. He is the author of Beyond Politics: The Private Governance Response to Climate Change. Mike also runs a project at Vanderbilt on how to reduce carbon emissions at the individual and household level.

Michael Vandenbergh: From my perspective, the great ideas out there are only great if they can also be institutionalized. I would like to see more focus, particularly from an organization like ELI, on the institutional strategy that would push companies and communities toward a more sustainable, lower-carbon future. But what kinds of institutions are needed to move technology in the right direction? We can have all the best technologies in the world, but if the incentives are not right, companies won’t deploy them.

Much of what guides the way people think about the environment is worldview. How do you account for the effects of worldview on behavior in striving toward sustainability? That is a challenge that has bedeviled the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. I don’t know that you’re going to solve it, but a sophisticated incorporation of some kind of behavioral component would be a useful addition to the decisionmaking model.

David Rejeski: Ann Condon is now an ELI visiting scholar, after a long career at General Electric focusing on its chemical stewardship program and the company’s sustainability work.

Ann Condon: Among my challenges at GE was figuring out how to meet our greenhouse gas goals, how to green our supply chain, and how to deal with reporting on conflict minerals.

Attorneys are comfortable with public law. We’re even comfortable with private environmental governance. But Big Data, additive manufacturing, blockchain — it is all happening so fast. Lately people have been telling me how blockchain is going to solve sourcing traceability problems. But we need all four of Scott and David’s quadrants to enable a tool like blockchain to work. Because if you don’t have standardization in deploying it, there will be four thousand blockchain traceability systems: one for every platform.

Take the conflict-free sourcing initiative which involved a lot of work to standardize the data gathering. That was critical to ensure the material traceability efforts were usable. These common data fields have to be negotiated, which requires collaboration. Collaboration in turn requires organizations that can facilitate that standardization. It also requires a push from the regulators.

If we don’t figure it out, we are going to look back in five or six years and realize blockchain will be just like other initiatives, RFID comes to mind, that showed great promise but haven’t solved the problem. If you can get the data right, it can be very powerful.

David Rejeski: Michael Mahoney is Pfizer’s vice president and assistant general counsel, and chief environmental health and safety officer and compliance counsel. He’s also a member of the Environmental Sustainability Steering Council and the past chair of the Environmental Law Committee of the New York Bar Association.

Michael Mahoney: I started at Pfizer as an environmental engineer in the mid 1980s. I spent most of my time helping the company comply with command-and-control regulations. It was never perfect because of the nature of the way the regulations were promulgated, but we worked hard to comply.

In the mid 1990s we witnessed the birth of private governance. I was very fortunate to be involved in the drafting of our environmental, health, and safety standards. We did it because we thought it was the right thing to do.

In 2006 we developed our environmental sustainability program. We went to management and sold it as the right thing to do. But we also sold it as a means to differentiate Pfizer from our competitors.

Today, we are beginning to see customers, including large governmental buyers, become more interested in our environmental footprint. Those companies that have good programs are going to be selling to these entities and those that don’t will not. The market opportunity is developing very quickly. It’s driving companies to action. But to succeed a company needs to have a solid program, including how it manages its supply chain.

We need a system where all these drivers are working in harmony. That would be the most efficient and effective. But in the meantime we should leverage those drivers for the opportunities they currently present.

So I would emphasize the market as a driver. Customers are demanding sustainability throughout the supply chain.

David Rejeski: Adrienne Hollis is both an environmental toxicologist and an environmental lawyer. She works on environmental justice issues and is director of federal policy in the D.C. office of WE ACT for Environmental Justice. I’ll ask her to give the perspective from a community level.

Adrienne Hollis: David and Scott’s article resonates with me both from a scientific perspective and also from a legal perspective.

Because I work with environmental justice communities, I look at it through that lens. In a perfect world, we would be touching all four quadrants equally. But there are some factors that people normally don’t take into account in such an analysis, and that’s the trust of the community.

In Quadrant 1, the role of government is to promote the will of the majority while protecting the rights of the minority. That really hasn’t happened, at least not recently. In this administration we see a shift away from legislation designed to protect the public. Privatization is also a big issue for communities. It is not just an economic issue, but an economic justice issue as well.

I want to talk about the need for community science. We used to call it citizen science, but it is really community science because we’re talking about exposure to everyone. Perfect examples are the immigrant camps and the people who are situated next to facilities that may be emitting toxic substances.

But I need to speak about the fact that science is under attack. It makes me question the fourth quadrant. Until we can reach a point where we respect the data, that quadrant is definitely at risk. The whole theory of the four quadrants is at risk.

David Rejeski: John Lovenburg is the environmental vice president for BNSF Railway. His portfolio includes remediation, hazardous material sustainability, environmental litigation, compliance, environmental permitting, agency engagement, environmental engineering, and environmental policy.

John Lovenburg: The four quadrants appear to be an accurate representation of what we are seeing in the environmental space. A good example of where integration is occurring is in data.

For instance, there are now very active community air monitoring programs. High school students are doing air monitoring. Agencies are doing mobile air monitoring. The result is a real explosion of data.

While there are obvious opportunities, from industry there is some initial reluctance. So from a public governance role, there is a real value in the agencies building the confidence of all of the stakeholders to trust the data.

I was a consultant during the 1990s and 2000s. We spent a lot of money collecting highly precise, very expensive data points. With current technologies, we’re collecting hundreds of data points very cheaply and very rapidly. As we get our arms around that data, the level of confidence among all stakeholders is going to go up.

As to private governance, for BNSF, environmental management systems are our way of internalizing all of the external systems — best practices, audits, corrective actions. I tell my team that if they find an error, use that as an opportunity to find potential system-wide fixes. This flips the usual attitude on its head. We are looking for errors so we can turn them into positives for the whole organization.

This is one way that private governance takes governance to an nth degree above an external system alone. For us the ratio is probably twenty to one: faults that we find internally through audits and other means versus problems a regulator may find during an inspection.

So in terms of what’s missing from this ecosystem of drivers, in Quadrant 2, included is managing risks, but there is also opportunity in discovering and handling issues.

A good example is TCFD, the new carbon reporting framework put together by the G20 nations. TCFD, the task force for climate-related financial disclosure, looks at opportunities and risks around climate. It is the first model that I have seen that dispassionately looks at policy, carbon pricing, physical risks, and impacts on markets.

Balancing risk and opportunity would be a good addition to the framework.

Second, I would add sustainability and sustainable solutions as the best way to find common ground.

I am co-leading an initiative with the railroad around electrification. It is a win-win because electric vehicles have triple the efficiency of internal combustion vehicles. That means using two-thirds less energy to move trains, trucks, cargo-handling equipment, et cetera.

Our team is charged up around BNSF’s electrification initiative because it is a sustainable solution. We eliminate onsite emissions, because we get electricity from offsite power plants. We can cut operating costs by two-thirds. We’re going to use fewer resources. We’re going to reduce our carbon footprint. That’s a perfect example of a sustainability win-win solution, and why I would add it to this framework.

David Rejeski: Paul Hagen practices both U.S. and international law as a partner at Beveridge & Diamond. He also works with corporations and trade associations.

Paul Hagen: Most of my work is in the product stewardship space. Our orientation creates a race to the top, because there is often a market access driver. The EU requires the electronics sector to fully understand what is in their products and to create a timeline for eliminating certain restricted substances. Today, whether you’re selling products in Vermont or Beijing, you have to orient yourself around global market access requirements and supply chains. We’ve seen what happens with conflict minerals as a for instance across the economy.

But the legal infrastructure that we’re working with is cumbersome and often antiquated. If we look at the four quadrants, and the evolution of data in driving technology solutions, in promoting environmental governance, those don’t operate in a vacuum. They operate in a world with disparate countries’ laws and international legal frameworks.

I spend a lot of my time working on the circular economy. Companies are committed to extending the life of products through repair and reuse. By reusing products, materials, and recycling, we really take advantage of those environmental and economic benefits at scale. Some of that is being driven by the EU, but a lot is driven by scarcity and efficiency interests.

Unfortunately, we are moving used and end-of-life products across international borders under a 30-year-old environmental treaty that the United States has not ratified. I have sat in the back of the room with U.S. government and other non-party observers to the Basel Convention on hazardous waste, watching as other governments decide how we’ll classify and move used products across frontiers.

One of the areas the circular economy focuses on is the reuse of plastics. In an effort aimed at minimizing plastic pollution, Norway has proposed bringing a larger universe of waste plastics under control under the Basel Convention. For parties to the Convention, it is a question of controlling certain shipments. But because the United States is a non-party, that’s really an import and export ban for us. The United States is operating in a legal framework that’s entirely different from the other 185 countries because we are a non-party.

It is hard for companies to innovate and for NGOs to collaborate if the legal infrastructure is not keeping up. So don’t overlook the importance of that legal quadrant. It’s the one on which these other dynamics can be built and operationalized.

David Rejeski: It’s time to bring in the audience, and I know Douglas Keare has a question.

Douglas Keare: I was pleased that the last three speakers focused on risk in the system. The consideration of risk in private-sector governance, whether financial or reputational, is nowhere even in the ballpark of the kinds of risk we should be paying attention to.

There are two factors that motivate me to stress this. The first is an excellent article by Henry Kissinger in The Atlantic, which is spurred by the headlong rush into artificial intelligence. It concentrated on the fact that science and technology, each motivated by their own monsters, are rushing to the future without restraint because what we have is an exponentially widening gap between what science and technology are discovering and our ability to understand it, let alone manage it or control it, and that’s not sustainable. The second factor is that some of the directions they’re rushing in are not desirable.

I am in favor of linking opportunity and risk. Maybe the way to look at the diagram is that it ought to be a pentagon rather than a square. The fifth section should be managing or identifying and avoiding existential risk but doing it within an opportunity framework such that a new technology emerges somewhere in the system.

Dave Rejeski: Gary Marchant of Arizona State University raises what he calls the pacing problem — to what extent can the legal framework of Quadrant 1 keep up with the rate of change — whether the instrument of change is AI, or blockchain, or anything else. Every time we discuss the issue of science and tech and the existential risks they raise, we find we are unable to figure out how to make this system change. Michael Lewis in his new book The Fifth Risk raises the issue of the way governments deal with existential risk.

Michael Vandenbergh: The overall goal of the system is to avoid catastrophic risk. Any chart like this assumes roughly an equilibrium status moving forward with growing GDP. If you take that away, then boom, everything goes haywire.

In terms of transitions, you can argue about what the Founders thought concerning how information would flow in a democracy and how that has changed. With today’s technology, if you wish you will only hear one side of what used to be an impartial presentation of the day’s events. That makes structuring a democratic discourse on environmental protection difficult. The very ability of governance systems, whether public or private, to function is being directly affected by developments in technology.

David Rejeski: Dan Hillis, who was one of the people who invented parallel computing, recently wrote an article titled “The Enlightenment is Dead, Long Live the Entanglement.” His thesis is that we are all essentially entangled with one another — through our machines and our organizations. That is going to lead to behavior that is difficult to predict and govern and to indeterminacy in a legal system.

Michael Vandenbergh: Many of us may not know that household electricity use has gone down in the last couple of years for the first time since World War II. A recent economics paper shows that the decline correlates almost perfectly with the introduction into the market of attractive, low cost LED light bulbs. Why did that happen? It happened partly because of government.

Ann Condon: “Ban the Bulb.”

Michael Vandenbergh: Indeed — government had a role but also companies like Walmart said if you can make one under $10 that looks good, we’ll sell it. So the manufacturers played a role as well. None of this was anticipated.

Paul Stern: I’m Paul Stern, working nowadays at the Social and Environmental Research Institute. But after a long career at the National Research Council, where I was a director in a number of projects in some of these areas, I wanted to focus on the issue of data in Quadrant 4 and the question about whether we’re getting a tsunami of information. Data are useful when they’re trusted and trustworthy. Data producers may be biased. They may be perceived to be biased. You want good data and you want trust for good data in order to inform decisionmaking.

I see this as an institutional challenge. How do you design institutions that allow the various parties interested and affected by decisionmaking to have data that they trust and that they ought to trust?

John Lovenburg: Let’s talk about corporate use of data. I received an updated number from our technology VP just two days ago. We generate 35 million readings per day from the sensors that we have on the railroad — thermal, acoustic, hyperspectral, cameras on locomotives, cameras in yards, drones flying over track. We use these sensors for safety, efficiency, and environmental purposes.

After track construction, you plant native vegetation to restore the ecosystem. The way we used to do it is to hire a biologist who would over the course of a week look at 30 miles of new track. Now we are flying a drone in ten minutes over the same area. It uses infrared cameras that plug into agricultural algorithms — and I can get quantitative data on restoration progress.

The issue of trust comes up when there are shared data. With air quality data, there can be skepticism among multiple parties that there could be the needed level of trust. With time, we’ll build some confidence. When you have overlapping data that produce the same answer, you start building confidence in the system. That speaks to the role agencies can play, to step in and help multiple parties adjudicate that data and build confidence.

Adrienne Hollis: On the issue of trust — people are going to have their own agendas. When communities are able to participate in data gathering, and to develop guidelines, that generates trust.

There are now personal air-quality monitors that update in real-time. In practice, ten people in the same community who were exposed to the same pollution plume and suffered adverse health effects would have a response to an industry monitor that says there was no release above the government standard.

So whom do you trust? Do we need to get people to agree that there is one particular trusted source of information that we all must acknowledge? Or do we say there’s a certain protocol that must be followed in order for data to be seen as valid?

Scott Schang: I’m Scott Schang with Landesa and formerly with the Environmental Law Institute. One point and two questions.

I wonder if we’re missing a driver in the form of private capital from philanthropies and unaccountable political donations that these days has such a force.

I wonder what this would look like if you did it in a developing world context. Is it the same map? Maybe it is but I’m not sure. Will it look like this in China, India, Myanmar, and Malawi? It might be interesting to ask that question, because it might inform our thinking about what our system looks like.

And then, finally, resources. What happens in each of these four quadrants when you resource them or don’t resource them? I would argue the only one of the four that is really resourced is technology. The other three, including private environmental governance, are largely starved because companies aren’t really putting much money into it.

Ann Condon: Can I weigh in on the developing country aspect? Because the model, maybe not the specifics of AI or Big Data, but of sustainable business tools, is actually even more important in many respects in the developing world because some of the other institutions aren’t very strong. There may be different tools in the buckets, but the concept is right.

Scott Schang: Where I work in the developing world, it’s the government that is acting as the business promoter, trying to get land to companies, and the companies are being asked to act like the government by providing basic social services and the environmental rule of law. So the roles have been exactly swapped and I wonder if that’s where we’re headed in the United States as well.

Holly Elwood: I’m Holly Elwood. I work at EPA. And for me, looking at the quadrants, I see my work very much 100 percent in the left quadrants. We are thinking of it as purely where the private sector lives, but there’s a really strong role for the federal government there. And as purchasers, as developers of product sustainability standards that we use to meet our sustainable procurement requirements, that’s a place where trust is absolutely vital.

I am glad you brought that topic up because without it no one will use those standards or eco-labels and we won’t be able to get to an agreed understanding of what we are trying to make happen in the market. I see a lot of work happening in that space right now and a lot of engagement from the private sector.

Michael Vandenbergh: I couldn’t agree more. You could argue that the disclosure of the Toxics Release Inventory data was one of the drivers for what you see in the private sector. As to trust, maybe this is a place where the public and the private side come together. Maybe it is time for a certification and standards system that applies to community-based data. That’s a place where the private sector might play a role if the public sector can’t.

Paul Hagen: Holly raises an excellent point in that this is a domain where there is a lot of evolution, a lot of action, particularly in the green-electronics space. There are expanding product certification schemes. There are governance issues. There are green procurement requirements.

The government is learning and adjusting. The private sector is learning and adjusting. The NGO community is trying to figure out how to come up with what Scott has described as the optimal solution space. Lawyers are not used to dynamic systems, where you have steady adjustments over time rather than etchings in stone.

Unfortunately, even the best private environmental governance schemes are operating at a scale that might be noteworthy but ultimately is insufficient.

Instead, we need to appreciate the role of governments. If we can come up with an approach with all the OECD governments, for example, it might take a little bit more time, but it would operate at a larger scale. Instead of letting one jurisdiction, for example, set the energy-efficiency standard for a product and everybody else has to fall in line because it’s a global marketplace, there is more of a collaborative process across multiple OECD countries. And then we could roll that standard or framework into the developing world.

David Rejeski: The trust issue actually goes through all four quadrants. I had an interesting discussion with somebody at the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency. DARPA has a group focused on explainable AI. One of their big worries is the machine learning algorithms are starting to make decisions that they can’t explain to the humans. Do we trust the algorithm? If you’re the decisionmaker in a company or you’re a CIA analyst, it’s a huge issue of whether this machine learning algorithm has told you something you didn’t know.

Thomas McHenry: I am the dean and president of Vermont Law School. This has been a fascinating discussion. It makes me wonder. Three quarters of our students come to Vermont Law School because they’re interested in pursuing careers in environmental law. What should we be teaching to allow students to take advantage of this paradigm?

Ann Condon: I have hired many legal interns over the years. Teaching environmental law is an important foundation, but a lot of folks that I see coming out of these very specialized environmental programs do not understand basic contracts. They don’t understand commercial relationships, including antitrust law. If lawyers don’t have that essential business background, they can’t integrate the environment into core business strategies.

Michael Mahoney: I would add that building a business case is vital to embedding sustainability in an organization. It is important that lawyers have the fundamentals in business and in finance. Students coming out of a sustainability background can really move a program if they have the tools. They can work with the right people in the company, explain where the trend is going, then make a business case. But lawyers coming out of school don’t have those basic tools. I didn’t when I graduated. I often think of going back and getting an MBA, because I think it is important to marry that with law.

Michael Vandenbergh: I published a short piece called “The New Private Advocacy” last fall that is directed at private lawyers. It is designed to do what you are saying. This is not just happening in law. I talked to a manager of one of the big environmental groups not long ago, and he told me he had to find a bunch of new people who understand the supply chain contract for bananas. It wasn’t enough to know which Senate committee did what. A complete lawyer today is someone who understands the public and the private side of environmental governance and knows all those different instruments.

Cross-training is really helpful. We teach a class with MBA students and law students together. They have to figure out how to interact with one another. That helps because their thinking patterns are so different.

Monica Medina: I now run a small environmental newsletter called Our Daily Planet, but I was in the government for a long time in and out many administrations.

The world of weather data is highly advanced and is a useful model. There may be lessons that could be learned from the way the World Meteorological Organization has pulled together science and business and created products and tools that we all know and use. The European model is more accurate potentially than the U.S. model, but the point being that there are a lot of data that have been collected for a long time on weather. The data sit in the government but are shared very well. There is an infrastructure in place to allow government-to-government sharing even with governments we don’t get along with.

Dave Rejeski: One of the earliest citizen science projects was connecting citizen meteorologists together via the telegraph. That was the Victorian Internet. It led to breakthroughs in forecasting. The Weather Service has been able to take legacy data from a century ago and integrate it with current data and use that for prediction. Weather forecasting is an area to look at for models, for anyone who is trying to learn how to do data integration, aggregation, and basically how to use distributed networks of both human and other types of sensors including satellites.

Unidentified Questioner: I have a question on the impact of what’s happening in Quadrant 1 on Quadrant 2. I speak as someone who spent the last 28 years in Quadrant 1. In the United States, as resources are being radically cut at the federal level and even as the legitimacy and role for environmental regulations are being questioned, will that have an effect on the demand in Quadrant 2 on the private side? I would like to think not­ — that reputational risk and financial risk will grow regardless of what is happening again at the national level in Quadrant 1. But am I being too hopeful?

Ann Condon: Standardization may drive the process here. When there are lots of conflicting requirements, product manufacturers will say, “Now we need to standardize.” Because if you have the Ohio rule and California rule and the Beijing rule, it almost becomes impossible for a manufacturer to figure out. If the federal government isn’t going to do it, then we need to have a private effort. That is when you get the push for private environmental governance.

Paul Hagen: Most of the folks we work with say they like a robust regulator because they can occupy an important part of the conversation. Even with the most well-regarded companies or NGOs, there’s always a conversation to frame.

John Lovenburg: We often get customers who will ask for carbon emissions data. We normalize our emissions by weight transported. If they want it normalized by volume, there is a disconnect. A different language is being spoken.

So BNSF is involved with EPA SmartWay and the Smart Freight Centre, all striving to come up with a single way of normalizing supply chain transportation carbon emissions.

Dave Rejeski: I spent yesterday with the Food and Drug Administration, which was having two days of meetings to create an enabling environment for the next 20 years of protein development. I was stunned with the foresight that FDA had. They’re listening to technology developers and creating an enabling environment. That could be setting standards, thresholds for data collection, whatever.

Michael Mahoney: If industry sees a reason to standardize because they see that the environment needs to be better protected, they can go a long way toward building the framework for a program that the government might step in and implement more widely. This is thus a great opportunity for partnership, where the industry can do some of the work until the government has the information and resources it needs.

Michael Vandenbergh: Lawyers can serve an enormously important role. One of the greatest benefits we bring to the table is that we’re comfortable working with environmental engineers and physicists and others. That’s a role ELI can continue to play as the field goes from being essentially a subfield of administrative law to something much broader.

We might think here as an institution about how to create convening settings where people from lots of different disciplines can work on common problems. This conversation was a start. TEF

On the first Earth Day, in April 1970, Senator Edmund Muskie called for “a total strategy to protect the total environment.” We have had time to pull this off — nearly a half century after Muskie’s clarion call — but have failed. Yes, gains in environmental quality have happened, but as time has passed, we have witnessed the emergence of global level, existential threats. The human race is pushing on or through what the Stockholm Resilience Center has called “planetary boundaries.” The old approaches have failed. But what would a new paradigm, built on lessons learned, look like?

Weaponizing Precaution
Author
Bernard D. Goldstein - University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public Health
University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public Health
Current Issue
Issue
1
Weaponizing Precaution

The title of a recent Financial Times article by the EU trade commissioner, Cecilia Malmstrom, says it all: “The EU will stand up for rules-based trade.” Written immediately after the Washington meeting between President Trump and European Commission President Juncker last summer, the article claims Europe has repetitively responded to President Trump’s trade threats by insisting that it is only following the rules.

But Brussels has followed neither the rules of international trade nor the laws of science in developing barriers against American grain, beef, and chicken, as well as against agricultural products from developing countries. Instead, the multinational organization has wrapped justification for its trade barriers in the green flag of the precautionary principle. Its intentional distortion of science differs little from those who deny climate change.

While Washington under President Trump holds a position on agricultural trade with the EU that is little different than his predecessors’, his confrontational style and language certainly are. Whether his aggressive approach will help or hurt American prospects of breaking arbitrary EU agricultural trade barriers remains uncertain.

After World War II, the push for agreements that would normalize and standardize international relations led to the development of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Its goal was “substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and the elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis.” The GATT’s major provisions were incorporated into its 1995 successor, the World Trade Organization. The WTO differs from the GATT in being an institution capable of making judgments and resolving disputes. The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement administered by WTO specifically aims at balancing the need for a country to be confident that imported food is safe to eat with ensuring that overly strict regulations “are not used as an excuse for protecting domestic suppliers.” While countries are encouraged to use international standards, they are permitted to set their own standards — but only if they are based on science and on a risk assessment. The SPS agreement also stresses the importance of consistent decisionmaking.

Despite repetitive attempts by Brussels, the WTO has not supported the EU’s contention that the precautionary principle can supplant science-based risk assessment. The origins of the precautionary principle can be traced to German laws developed in the 1970s to combat air pollution. The principle’s key concepts are easily supportable: the need to act protectively despite scientific uncertainty, and the placing of the burden for information about safety on those who benefit from the sale of the product. Its centrality to EU environmental governance has led it to be included in seminal EU documents, such as the 2007 Lisbon Treaty.

Although EU documents frequently describe the precautionary principle as being “enshrined,” it is not consistently defined. A 2015 document of the European Parliamentary Research Service considering intra-EU use of the precautionary principle states: “There is no universally accepted definition of the precautionary principle. Interpretations mainly vary according to the degree of scientific uncertainty that could prompt action by the authorities.”

In part because of this lack of a consistent definition, the precautionary principle has been a malleable instrument of EU agricultural protectionism responsive both to a strong farm lobby and to the belief of Europeans in the superiority of their food products.

The lack of a clear definition inevitably clashes with the rules-based approach envisioned in the establishment of the World Trade Organization and the SPS system it administers. In contrast to concerns about a new chemical or other potential environmental pollutant, in which the presumption of potential harm is appropriate, the presumption of the WTO agreement is that free trade is desirable and should be interfered with only if there is a reasonable degree of scientific certainty in the form of a risk analysis. Without consistent risk-based standards, disruption of free trade by domestic considerations would otherwise be inevitable.

Another problematic aspect of Brussels’s use of the principle in world trade is that the precautionary principle inherently provides only a temporary determination that is subject to confirmation or revocation depending upon further evidence. To invoke the principle requires scientific uncertainty. If there were reasonable scientific certainty, action would be taken without the need to invoke precaution. Also by definition, the precautionary action must have significant economic or social costs — if the costs were trivial, the action would be taken on the basis of the threat alone. It logically follows that action under the precautionary principle can be a costly mistake; it also follows that the more precautionary a society, the greater the likelihood of such costs.

Accordingly, invoking the principle should be seen as provisional and as a call for further scientific evaluation. This provisional nature is in fact recognized in some of the principle’s formulations, including in a 2005 Environmental Charter amending the French Constitution. But in no case has Brussels reversed its agricultural trade bans despite continued lack of scientific evidence of adverse effects, including the failure to be able to attribute ill health to the chicken, beef, or grain routinely eaten by Americans in the decades since the European bans have been in effect. Political scientists, including Alisdair Young and Peter Holmes of the United Kingdom, who wrote a chapter titled “Protection or Protectionism?” in a book on EU governance of food safety, have argued that the complex institutional issues related to obtaining agreement among many member countries present significant obstacles to changing existing rules.

Aflatoxin is a liver carcinogen produced by a mold that is common on wet produce. It is a major cause of cancer in tropical nations. Based upon the precautionary principle, in 1998 the EU established a 10-fold more stringent aflatoxin standard than other nations, much to the benefit of EU farmers. A World Bank analysis estimated that sub-Saharan African nations lost $670 million yearly in trade at a benefit of one less death per 10 million Europeans per 70 years — well below EU action levels for other risk-related issues. Giandomenico Maione, a respected European economist, pointed out that these nations were generously supported by their former colonial masters and that increasing their poverty would increase their need for support.

Also of concern was rainforest tree loss. Nut-bearing trees were cut for their wood, as their nuts could no longer be sold to the EU, and trade routes for agricultural produce were limited by dependency on former colonial linkages. Review of the EU aflatoxin standard by the Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives, a body of the World Health Organization and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, concluded that achieving the new standard would have no significant public health benefits.

The aflatoxin issue has much broader ramifications, including affecting the Doha Trade Round. Begun in 2001, this was a major effort under the WTO to lower trade barriers. While not the only reason for failure, mistrust of the EU’s use of the precautionary principle to circumvent trade liberalization agreements was a factor.

In 1989, Brussels prohibited importation of meat and meat products from animals treated with growth hormone promoters, then routinely used in the United States and other major cattle-raising countries. The EU based the ban on the precautionary principle, arguing with no direct evidence that it was possible that the hormones might persist in meat eaten by consumers and thus cause cancer. In 1996 the United States and Canada won its case at the then new WTO because of the lack of scientific support for the ban. The case led to countervailing tariffs by the United States and Canada on European agricultural products. In 2004 the EU failed again in a new WTO proceeding attempting to remove U.S. and Canadian sanctions, still being unable to support the existence of a risk.

Early in the Obama administration, Washington and Brussels entered into a political agreement in which the United States agreed to remove its countervailing tariffs in exchange for the EU’s accepting a quota of American beef not subject to tariffs, but also not treated with growth hormones. However, in late 2016, Obama’s frustrated U.S. trade representative, Michael Froman, claiming EU failures to comply, pulled Washington out of this agreement and initiated the process potentially leading to reinstatement of countervailing tariffs. In essence, the issue was punted to President Trump, who can now claim that Obama’s style of negotiating with the EU was unsuccessful. Ottawa, which formerly had stood with Washington on this issue, has recently concluded a more favorable beef export arrangement with the EU, an issue likely contributing to current differences on trade between the two neighbors.

Perhaps the best evidence of the lack of science underlying Europe’s trade barrier on genetically modified foods is a 2012 quote from the EU’s first chief science adviser, Ann Glover: “There is no substantiated case of any adverse impact on human health, animal health or environmental health, so that’s pretty robust evidence . . . there is no more risk in eating GMO food than eating conventionally farmed food.” Bowing to the complaints of NGOs and of EU agribusiness upset with Glover’s science-based position, the president of the European Commission responded by simply abolishing its Office of the Chief Scientist — much to the chagrin of EU scientists.

The scientific organizations whose opinions support GM food safety include the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the World Health Organization, the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, the Swiss National Research Program — and even the European Food Safety Authority. EU leadership realizes that having bowed to anti-science activists and farm interests they have lost ground in the competition to use genetics as a source of innovative technology. This has led them to try to avoid applying the precautionary principle to other new technological areas such as nanotechnology.

European NGO opposition to genetically modified foods approaches religious fervor. Particularly dismaying is the continued objections to golden rice. This strain of genetically modified grain contains beta-carotene, a precursor to vitamin A. Deficiency in vitamin A causes upwards of one million deaths and cases of blindness in developing countries. The supplemented rice is produced on a non-profit basis so should be immune to standard attacks against evil corporate empires.

Another example of the perversity of the anti-GMO opponents in the face of food science is acrylamides, which EFSA believes to be cancer-causing. Acrylamides are produced from natural precursors in food during heating. A major dietary acrylamide source is fried potatoes, including potato chips. A GM potato that produces far less acrylamide when fried has been approved by the United States and Canada. Although to the EU science-based food authority this GMO potato would be a cancer-preventing food, it will not be allowed into Europe.

And still another flagrant example of EU handwaving to justify an agricultural trade ban is the exclusion of American chicken. In 1997 the EU banned the importation of U.S.-raised chicken carcasses on the basis that washing in chlorine to decrease bacterial contamination would lead to the presence of cancer-causing compounds in chicken meat. Failing to receive support from EFSA or any other reputable scientific body, this rationale has continued to morph. Claims include that chlorine washing supposedly causes antibiotic resistance, again contradicted by EFSA. The present rationale appears to be based primarily on what might happen if the chlorine wash was poorly done and other U.S.-required approaches to limit bacterial growth in chicken products were not scrupulously followed. This seems equivalent to the United States using the Volkwagen scandal as a rationale to ban the importation of all cars from Europe.

British free-marketeers have encouraged the UK to quickly agree to accepting American chicken meat as part of a post-Brexit trade deal, arguing that it would bring down the price to British consumers by more than 20 percent. They point out that the UK government has never advised its citizens traveling to the United States not to eat the chicken. While no doubt said tongue in cheek, this is a valid point. With close to 15 million Europeans expected to visit America every year, if EU countries truly believed that serious and potentially lethal infectious diseases due to eating chicken contaminated by such microbes as salmonella or campylobacter were truly a higher risk in the United States, it would be irresponsible not to issue travelers advisories about chicken, as well as beef and grain products. In fact, a study of travel-associated campylobacteriosis found that Swedish citizens traveling to North America had a risk per 100,000 of 3.5, while much higher rates were observed in those traveling to western Europe (15.1) and southern Europe (55.8).

Perhaps the U.S. State Department should issue warnings to American travelers about eating chicken while in Europe.

Trade issues tend to have relatively high priority for new presidents, who usually come to office with a focus on the economy. However, the priority given to trade falls with the inevitable onslaught of other pressing global issues for which allies are needed. As our European friends are well aware, American administrations long have used trade deals as a way to coax allies or adversaries on foreign policy issues. President Trump so far appears more focused on maintaining pressure on U.S. trade issues, but has not been immune to the temptation of dangling leniency on tariffs to get China to support reining in North Korea.

Brussels historically has had a far more focused effect on trade than Washington, including the ability to link diverse environmental issues to its trade advantage. As one example, it is inconceivable that the EU would have chosen to decrease its automotive carbon footprint by providing a tax advantage to the purchase of hybrid cars primarily produced in Japan — which is what the United States did. Instead the European countries focused tax advantages on diesel — a technology in which, not coincidentally, they are leaders.

Various reasons are given for the greater willingness of American farmers to aggressively intervene in improving livestock and farming yields. In addition to being less risk-averse, the United States is said to have initially prospered through its use of agricultural resources while Britain and other EU countries prospered primarily through urban labor. Freedom in the use of private property is also more important to Americans than Europeans, which I reported with my colleague Juliann Hudak in studying the American right wing’s opposition to sustainability.

A little noted difference between the two dominions is the lockstep virtual unanimity of all European NGOs, in contrast to the diversity among American NGOs, on issues ranging from hydrofracturing for shale gas to food safety issues. One of the strongest U.S.-based NGOs in the food safety arena, the Center for Science in the Public Interest, cautiously supports genetically modified foods, arguing that it is irresponsible to throw out a scientific approach that might be needed to feed the world. The unanimity of European NGOs appears to reflect the European process that values achieving an orderly consensus.

The drive toward consensus among EU nations in establishing European policy also leans toward adoption of more stringent standards, often based on political factors including the strength of the agricultural sector in the most risk-averse nation. For agricultural policy this is usually France. At the time of the Juncker-Trump meeting in Washington, the French finance minister was quoted as saying, “Agriculture must remain outside the field of these discussions. Non-tariff agricultural barriers are not negotiable. We have stringent health, food and environmental norms as well as rules of production that we are attached to.” Juncker has since been quoted by the Wall Street Journal as saying that the United States “heavily insisted to insert the whole field of agricultural products — we refused that because I don’t have a mandate and that’s a very sensitive issue in Europe.”

The public response on the continent is predictable. Although based on negligible evidence, it is an article of faith among most Europeans that they are now far ahead of Americans in environmental health regulations and practice. The EU cultural belief that U.S. food practices are unsafe complicates their willingness to apply scientific findings toward consistently defined acceptable levels of precaution or to accepting the provisionality of actions under the principle.

This belief was central to European public opposition to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations that are now on hold. I was teaching in Germany and, in an admittedly small sample, discovered no impact of the Volkswagen scandal on the belief in EU regulatory superiority on environmental or food safety issues. That Washington was fining Volkswagen for cheating on its diesel emission testing was viewed by many Germans as simply U.S. payback for the EU’s propensity to levy large fines on Google and other American high tech leaders.

United States concerns with EU policies go well beyond European agricultural barriers. They include the EU countries’ failure to meet their NATO defense spending commitments; the advantage to Germany of having its goods priced in a euro weakened by less productive EU countries; and Trump’s perception that the Paris Agreement on climate change is economically unfair to the United States. The outcome of each issue is unclear. It is also possible that the issues may be linked together in some grand arrangement — an effort that may attract the American president’s belief in his dealmaking capabilities. Linkage of issues appeared in his speech announcing withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, when he explicitly included Europe’s military spending deficit in his rationale, stating: “The same nations asking us to stay in the agreement are the countries that have collectively cost America trillions of dollars through tough trade practices and, in many cases, lax contributions to our critical military alliance.”

The unfolding of Brexit also complicates predictions, and also is at least partly linked to trade. On his visit to Britain, Trump pointedly advised Prime Minister Theresa May that the UK would not receive a favorable trade deal with the United States when it leaves the EU if it still adheres to exclusionary EU trade rules. Liam Fox, the British minister responsible for trade, has been quoted by the BBC as saying that “markets for agri-food products were among the hardest fought elements of trade deals and often among the last areas to be agreed.” It is quite possible that Washington has not yet pressed Brussels hard on agricultural issues while waiting for the negotiations on Brexit to be completed.

Globally, the EU’s allegations of lack of safety of American foods has been a convenient excuse for other countries to exclude our products, such as Russia and China in regards to chicken. Within the United States, many industries are leery of a trade war. However, a Wall Street Journal article last September titled “Industries Join in Lobbying to Halt Tariffs” noted the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association as an exception.

Another factor that might play a role in the agricultural discussions is the increasing EU agricultural trade surplus with the United States. This began in the 1990s, roughly concomitant with the institution of European trade barriers on American agricultural products. The EU agricultural trade surplus has continued to increase, reaching $12 billion in 2015. It is mostly due to our importation of high-end agricultural products like wine and cheese that could well be tempting targets for tariffs, particularly since they are also produced in the United States.

Brussels’s banning of major American agricultural products is based on easily discreditable handwaving rather than the scientific basis called for in WTO rules. It completely contradicts the EU’s protestations of support for rules-based trade. In 2002 Margot Wallstrom, then the EU commissioner of the environment and now the Swedish foreign minister, gave a speech in Washington in which she said, “We do not spend our days in Brussels as some might think in Machiavellian plotting to apply precaution to the detriment of U.S. businesses.” Machiavelli, of course, was a European. TEF

LEAD FEATURE ❧ Akin to climate deniers, the EU distorts science to halt imports of food from the United States and other nations. The result is a trade imbalance in agricultural goods, hurting American producers and impoverishing developing-country farmers at the same time.

Independent Oversight and the Rule of Law
Author
Scott Fulton - Environmental Law Institute
Environmental Law Institute
Current Issue
Issue
6
Scott Fulton

There has been a good deal of focus of late on the role of independent oversight in the administration of government operations. Sometimes oversight mechanisms are created in an ad hoc manner in response to particular issues, as with the appointment of an independent counsel. More often it proceeds under the established system of checks built into law to help ensure transparent, effective, and ethical effectuation of government authorities and duties.

The offices of inspector general that are attached to, but independent from, the various departments and agencies of the federal government serve as one key element of that architecture, along with the Standards of Conduct for Executive Branch Employees developed by the Office of Government Ethics that provide a consistent baseline of expectation, and a yardstick against which the IG community does its work. There is, I believe, consensus support for these mechanisms, and their state law counterparts, as vehicles for preventing or redressing fraud, waste, and abuse in government programs, but I thought I might reflect a bit on the importance of independent oversight in formation of rule of law.

Rule of law has been defined within the United Nations system as the “principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.”

This definition contains three related strands: the idea that law be consistent with fundamental rights; the notion that law be inclusively developed and fairly effectuated; and the importance of accountability not just on paper but in practice, such that the law becomes operative through observance of, or compliance with, the law. The three strands are best seen as interdependent: when law is consistent with fundamental rights, and is inclusively promulgated and even-handedly implemented, then the law will be respected by the community. Conversely, if the law is neither respected nor observed, then the societal values and objectives reflected in law will prove elusive. Ultimately, rule of law reflects a transformation of words on paper into action in the sense that the law, in effect, comes to “rule” or govern, as manifested by the conforming behavior of the regulated community.

Experience to date in the environmental setting permits a more granular understanding of the conditions necessary for formation of rule of law, as reflected by the consensus declaration contained in UN Environment’s 2013 Governing Council Decision 27/9. This decision recognized that for environmental rule of law to emerge, key “mutually supporting” governance features need to be in place, “including information disclosure, public participation, implementable and enforceable laws, and implementation and accountability mechanisms including coordination of roles as well as environmental auditing and criminal, civil and administrative enforcement with timely, impartial and independent dispute resolution.”

If this formulation generally looks familiar, there is a reason for that: it is based strongly on the U.S. experience and reflects a set of messages that our government has for decades been propagating to the rest of the world based on our conviction that these are indeed the key ingredients. Notably, “environmental auditing” as used here refers to the function of auditors general, inspectors general, and other organs of government dedicated to stemming fraud, waste, and abuse in government programs. Behind this text was the recognition that, for many countries, corruption remains a major issue both generally and in the environmental context. Corruption compromises and masks environmental decisions, manipulates public awareness, clouds understanding not only of environmental conditions but also the efficacy of corrective measures, and distorts compliance assessment and commitment. So, even more than the absence of law, and more than the absence of resources, the lack of public integrity stands as the primary barrier to formation of rule of law and achievement of environmental quality around the world.

When we consider the remarkable improvements that we have achieved in this country, let’s give due credit to the system of rules and oversight mechanisms that help guarantee integrity. It’s certainly true that when you work in government, oversight can at times feel intrusive, distracting, and unwelcome. But wherever would we be without these checks?

Public integrity through independent oversight may well be the secret sauce in our rule-of-law formula, and is one of the key difference-makers around the world in advancing environmental quality.

Independent oversight and the rule of law.

The Prospect for Boring Times Is Becoming Increasingly Attractive
Author
Richard Lazarus - Harvard University
Harvard University
Current Issue
Issue
6
Richard Lazarus

During the campaign trail, candidate Donald Trump famously said, “We will have so much winning if I get elected that you may get bored with winning.” If excessive winning were the touchstone for boredom, the Justice Department attorneys defending Trump environmental policies would be enjoying fascinating lives these days. Too much winning has not been their problem.

Since taking office, the administration has suffered 22 losses in federal environmental court cases, excluding any losses defending Obama policies. That’s a remarkable number. The losses cut across several agencies, including the departments of Army, Commerce, Energy, Interior, State, and Transportation. But the biggest loser is EPA, which accounts for a whopping 15 losses.

Also telling is the nature of the losses. Most have resulted from Trump’s rush to try to delay or suspend implementation of currently applicable environmental regulations adopted by prior administrations.

By the close of this summer, federal courts in eight cases have ruled that the Trump administration had acted unlawfully in seeking to delay and suspend an environmental rule that the federal agency had previously adopted. And in six additional cases, federal courts held that the administration had acted unlawfully by failing within a reasonable time to promulgate an environmental regulation or make a decision mandated by an environmental statute.

What makes this lopsided record so striking is that the federal government historically wins the vast majority of its cases. That is why when I first arrived at the Justice Department’s environment division decades ago, it took me months to appreciate that the federal rules of appellate procedure required the “appellant” brief to be filed with a blue cover and the “appellee” brief to be filed with a red cover. Because the government almost never loses in federal district court, I had only seen red briefs. Only after months there when I noticed an anomalous blue-covered brief in a pile and asked why the color was different, did I learn the reason. It was the rare instance when the government had lost and had to file an appellant’s brief.

There are also reasons for why the government normally tends to win most of its cases. The first is that the career Justice Department lawyers and their career counterparts in the client agencies are excellent attorneys. They are careful, rigorous, and expert at knowing how to pitch even the most challenging legal arguments in the best possible way, which includes knowing precisely how much, and not more, to ask of a court and what not to ask.

The second reason is that the federal government enjoys a lot of favorable presumptions in federal litigation. There are presumptions of regularity and reasonableness. Judges are generally inclined to find as credible government attorney assertions about federal practices or the urgency of certain public policy concerns. Those opposing the federal government face a major hurdle in overcoming the government attorney’s formal courtroom assertions “on behalf of the United States.”

But, of course, that is precisely what makes all the more telling such a high number of litigation losses. The lessons are several and portentous for the Trump administration — for its environmental policies, but with implications beyond environmental law.

The first is that a presidential administration that ignores the advice and expertise of career government personnel, including lawyers, does so at its peril. That is true for career government employees at Justice and no less true for those in their client agencies. You cannot succeed without their assistance to effectuate meaningful change.

But that is reportedly what Trump has sought to do, particularly in the environmental agencies and especially at EPA. The administration has repeatedly made significant decisions without seeking or ignoring the advice of expert career attorneys, economists, and scientists. Whatever one thinks of the Supreme Court’s opinion last June in the “travel ban” case, the president was clearly able to claim victory only because career government personnel had the opportunity to address the enormous legal infirmities in Trump’s first two executive orders.

The second lesson, however, has even longer term implications. The current administration risks squandering the federal government’s essential credibility in the federal courts. So long as the administration’s actions in the near term warrant such judicial disrespect, that is as it must be. But the concern is that the lack of deference will, once established, persist in the future when that is no longer so and proper deference is needed for effective government.

The Trump presidency has certainly not been boring. But with its penchant for generating ceaseless breaking news, the prospect of boring times is increasingly attractive.

The prospect for boring times is becoming increasingly attractive.

Waiting to See if Promises Made Are Kept
Author
Karen R. Harned - NFIB Small Business Legal Center
NFIB Small Business Legal Center
Current Issue
Issue
6
Parent Article

When it comes to regulations, small businesses bear a disproportionate amount of the burden. This is not surprising, since it’s the small business owner, not one of a team of “compliance officers,” who is charged with understanding new regulations, filling out required paperwork, and ensuring the business complies with new federal mandates. The small business owner is the compliance officer for his or her business. Every hour spent understanding and complying with federal regulation is one less hour available to service customers and plan for future growth.

Under President Obama, the regulatory burden on small business dramatically increased, in large part due to actions taken by the Environmental Protection Agency. EPA regulations impose significant costs on small businesses operating on razor-thin margins and impact businesses’ land use. In 2012 and again 2016, environmental regulation shot up as a significant issue that small business owners cited when explaining why they could not grow as documented in our quadrennial “Small Business Problems and Priorities” report.

America’s small business owners view President Trump’s commitment to rolling back unnecessarily burdensome and duplicative regulation as one of his administration’s greatest accomplishments to date. EPA, in particular, has made important regulatory promises — promises that America’s small business owners expect the agency to keep.

Under Administrator Scott Pruitt and now Acting Administrator Andrew Wheeler, the Trump EPA has made a positive shift in its regulatory footprint over America’s job creators. The agency’s commitment to going “back to the basics” and focusing on its core mission was welcome news to small businesses who viewed the Obama EPA as extremely aggressive in acting outside of its statutory authority and imposing new mandates on them.

And small businesses were pleased with Pruitt’s announcement directing EPA to discontinue the extortionist practice the agency had engaged in for years known as “sue and settle,” in which EPA would “settle” litigation brought by outside groups that often resulted in new regulatory burdens on entities that were not even parties to the original lawsuit.

But there is still work to be done.

What is and is not land over which the EPA has regulatory jurisdiction for purposes of wetland permitting under the Clean Water Act has been a debate that has raged on for decades. President Obama’s EPA worked to solve the problem by claiming that when it came to where water travels, even during a few days or weeks of the year, there are precious few parts of the country containing truly intrastate wetlands subject only to state regulation.

The Waters of the United States rule issued in June 2015 has had a significant financial impact on many small businesses, who often have been prevented from doing anything with their property, which frequently is their biggest asset. Under Pruitt, EPA announced that it would revisit the rule and constitutionally rebalance it so that states, not the federal government, have primary regulatory authority over intrastate wetlands. Despite an Executive Order directing such action and agency promises to fix the problem, however, nearly two years into the administration, small business is still waiting for a regulatory proposal.

A little more progress has been made to eliminate some of the costliest parts of the Clean Power Plan rule that would have compelled states to find a mix of alternative energy sources, like wind and solar, to make up for the shuttering of coal-fired power plants. EPA admitted that the rule, which is currently subject to a Supreme Court stay, would significantly raise the cost of electricity and threaten its reliability.

Our research shows that the cost of electricity is already a top concern among small business owners across the country. Small businesses would be squeezed between higher direct expenses and lower consumer demand resulting from higher home electric bills. In August, the agency issued a proposed rulemaking that small businesses hope would have a much lesser economic impact on small business than the Obama rule.

Pruitt took positive steps to reduce the impact of environmental regulation on small businesses. As acting administrator, Wheeler has promised to continue this important work, which would alleviate a lot of the regulatory pressure small businesses face today. America’s small businesses remain optimistic that this will be another promise made, promise kept.

Pruitt’s Gone, But Wheeler Carries on Agenda
Author
Myron Ebell - Competitive Enterprise Institute
Competitive Enterprise Institute
Current Issue
Issue
6
Parent Article

Scott Pruitt’s 16-month tenure as EPA administrator turned out to be a mixed bag. When President-elect Trump nominated Pruitt, he thought he was getting exactly what he wanted: an aggressive outsider; an able public advocate; and, most importantly, someone who as Oklahoma’s attorney general had shown that he was just as opposed to Obama’s climate agenda and regulatory onslaught as was Trump.

Pruitt turned out to be suitably aggressive and an energetic promoter of Trump’s policies. Most notably, he provided stalwart support inside the administration and in public of the president’s decision to withdraw from the Paris climate treaty. But he also turned out not to be a hands-on administrator. Repeals of major rules were regularly announced, but the legal paperwork often turned out to be sloppy and the process of moving rulemakings forward often seemed stuck in neutral.

Pruitt came to the job without any experience of working inside the EPA or of managing a large organization. What he needed was a competent deputy administrator who had worked at EPA and knew how it operated and where the roadblocks were. That person was Andrew Wheeler, but the president’s dysfunctional personnel process didn’t manage to nominate Wheeler until October 2017 and the Senate didn’t confirm him until April.

By the time Wheeler was sworn in, Pruitt was under assault for ethical lapses by environmental pressure groups and the mainstream media. The charges against him were mostly small potatoes, some were ridiculous, and even the serious ones were hardly unusual. One of the most serious was that he rented a bedroom in a condo on a $50 nightly basis from a K Street power couple. It does look improper, but it had been cleared by EPA’s ethics counsel. Compare the endless recycling of this story to the big news in 2010 that Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner had lived rent-free for nine months in a $3.5 million house owned by a Wall Street executive. But the story of Geithner’s special deal (which also had been cleared by his agency’s ethics counsel) disappeared in a couple days.

Regardless of the magnitude of the offenses, Pruitt did a poor job defending himself. Time and again, he appeared arrogant and tone deaf. And he should have been prepared for the unrelenting attacks, but was not. In particular, in taking on the EPA bureaucracy, Pruitt seemed unaware of the magnitude of the challenge. He would have done well to study what happened to the only previous administrator who tried. Anne Gorsuch Burford was an outsider picked by President Reagan in 1981 to reform what was already an out-of-control bureaucracy. She was run out of town in 1983.

Andrew Wheeler is now acting administrator and may be nominated after the election to be administrator. I have known and occasionally worked with Wheeler for two decades and can attest to his commitment to and competence in getting the job done. It is a high recommendation that he has worked in his career for two great Americans — for Senator James M. Inhofe on the staff of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee and for Bob Murray of Murray Energy as a lobbyist.

There is no doubt that Wheeler will continue to implement the deregulatory agenda. That’s because it’s President Trump’s agenda, which is based on a coherent set of campaign promises. The Waters of the United States Rule will be replaced with something that is constitutional. The so-called Clean Power Plan will be replaced with something that is legal. And so on.

On whether Wheeler succeeds in his second main charge — reforming the worst aspects of the agency in terms of mismanagement, lack of accountability, and freelance regulating far beyond what Congress has authorized — history says no (see Pruitt and Burford). On the other hand, Pruitt hired an expert in management and re-organization from Arizona state government, Henry Darwin, as chief operating officer. Darwin has now been named acting deputy administrator.

To reform one of the swampiest bureaucracies is a challenge. As a former official who served under Carol Browner in the Clinton EPA said to me at the height of the Pruitt furor, “We learned early on that you don’t ever want to cross senior EPA career staff.” To make progress, Wheeler and Darwin are going to need help from Congress. The signs are not good. OMB Director Mick Mulvaney requested a 31 percent cut in EPA’s budget for FY 2017. The Republican Congress pulled that back to 6 percent.

It’s not going to be possible to reform EPA’s recalcitrant bureaucracy without deep staff cuts. Much of the agency’s work, especially in terms of monitoring and enforcement, has been turned over to state agencies. Having lots of spare regulators with time on their hands and mischief on their minds will always lead to freelancing and over-regulation.

A Voluntary Federal Framework
Author
Charles Hernick - Citizens for Responsible Energy Solutions
Citizens for Responsible Energy Solutions
Current Issue
Issue
6
A Voluntary Federal Framework

States and local governments have established their own policies to shift toward clean energy for over a decade, and the private sector is providing customers with more clean energy solutions in every part of the economy each new year. Hybrid cars are commonplace, electric vehicles are on the rise, homes and businesses are more energy efficient than ever, and utilities across America are providing renewable power on demand to corporate and residential customers.

As a result, U.S. greenhouse gas emissions have fallen to their lowest levels since 1991, and power-sector emissions are 28 percent below their 2005 peak. Thousands of companies and municipalities now calculate their emissions and have taken measurable steps to reduce their carbon footprint. Green bonds — financial tools often used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions — attracted over $150 billion of investment last year, double what it was the year before.

While these are encouraging signs, there is opportunity to harness these decisions in a more comprehensive way. Currently, these actions are not reported to a single system where they can be aggregated, and their collective impact better understood and optimized. Beyond making reductions on their own, many businesses pay someone else to reduce, avoid, or sequester carbon because it’s cost effective. In the United States alone, a $28 billion a year offset credit market has grown to meet this demand.

Instead of superseding these actions and actors, federal policymakers should build on the achievements of states and momentum inside the private sector by creating a voluntary reporting and offset exchange system that empowers additional actors and actions. A voluntary greenhouse gas emissions registry and standards for carbon offsets will mainstream emissions reductions efforts and increase capital investment in clean energy.

The pressure faced by Congress to address climate change — especially from millennials — and the Trump administration’s simultaneous proposals to replace the Clean Power Plan call for pragmatic policy solutions. Focusing on reporting and offset exchanges is consistent with the market-based mechanisms that states have been using to reduce greenhouse gases for over a decade. Currently, 10 states use compliance-driven cap-and-trade markets; it’s expected that 12 will do so within the next year.

Carbon capture and storage offsets may be a particularly important approach for CPP replacement rulemaking. It is more cost effective than ever since Congress established “45Q” tax credits for this type of voluntary offset early in 2018. However, there must be systems for accounting and transferability to assure American taxpayers of the value and longevity of this approach.

While a voluntary federal reporting and offset accountability system will not satisfy the proponents of firm-handed federal caps and mandates, it is the most politically viable approach to supporting states’ rights and local action and guiding the invisible hand of free markets to further drive down emissions and mitigate climate change.

Rapid adoption of corporate social responsibility practices, sustainability and even shareholder demands are causing many companies to voluntarily report and reduce their emissions. These private efforts are notable and shouldn’t just be applauded—those emissions reductions should be counted.

There is substantial money flowing into these voluntary reductions. The market for green bonds has grown significantly. Green bonds are issued to finance projects — like wind and solar power installation, or capital investments in energy efficiency — with specific environmental outcomes, namely reducing carbon emissions. To date, these bonds have been issued by corporations like Apple and Starbucks, universities, and municipalities across the United States. The doubling of investment in green bonds in just one year happened in part because they are being bundled into mutual funds.

A strictly voluntary federal registry would assist organizations in measuring, reporting, and verifying the carbon in their operations so they can better manage and reduce emissions. As a voluntary approach, there would be no federal mandate, but there would be a national tracking mechanism that could link to, or build off, the existing mandatory federal carbon registry for power plants. A centralized reporting mechanism could be very helpful to the leaders of over 400 cities and municipalities joined together as The Climate Mayors to reduce their own emissions. Additionally, more than 3,500 mayors, governors, CEOs, college presidents, faith organizations, and tribal leaders have moved to similarly track and reduce emissions.

Sometimes it is more cost effective to reduce emissions elsewhere rather than cut emissions on your own. To that end, offset credits can be purchased voluntarily to compensate for emissions that occur elsewhere. Offset credits are generated by certified projects or activities that reduce, avoid, or sequester carbon — for example, by switching to cleaner fuel sources, by planting trees that pull carbon dioxide from the air, or by injecting carbon dioxide into the ground. These are offset markets in which a voluntary transaction takes place because the seller has a business interest in developing offset credits and the buyer is either seeking to reduce its own emissions or is regulated and finds it more cost effective to purchase offsets.

The buyers of voluntary offset credits typically represent for-profit organizations from the energy, finance and insurance, consumer goods, and events and entertainment industries. General Motors is a top voluntary offset buyer, offsetting 8 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent over five years, with a budget of $40 million. Other top-offsetting U.S. corporations include Delta Airlines and Pacific Gas and Electric Company.

In the United States, dozens of businesses and organizations develop and sell offset credits totaling 10 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent valued at $28 million in 2016. Offset projects are spread across the U.S. Methane capture projects make up over 40 percent of the offset market and have been developed in every state. Many forestry projects take place in the Southeast and rice projects are common in the South.

To facilitate growth in offset markets, the federal government should develop guidelines for the voluntary exchange of carbon offset credits — it could, for example, establish common trading units for offsets. A federal standard could result in lower costs for local and state governments to meet emissions-reduction goals. By creating market standards, barriers for small businesses to engage these markets will be reduced and the door to additional markets that have emissions trading systems in Europe and China could someday open.

Creating a framework for common accounting could make local markets more efficient — and assure that voluntary developers of offset credits are accountable for the products they are selling. It may also be particularly important and useful for transparency, since Congress established a tax credit for carbon capture and storage as the first mechanism for voluntary offsets purchases by the American taxpayer.

Focusing on a voluntary reporting and offset exchange is consistent with the market-based mechanisms to control pollution that states have been using for reducing greenhouse gases for over a decade. Indeed, it would preserve states’ rights and leadership in this space. Market-based instruments encourage behavior change — they guide the invisible hand through changes in prices, rather than through explicit directives regarding pollution-control levels or methods. Market-based approaches encourage businesses or individuals to undertake pollution-control efforts that are in their own interests and that collectively meet policy goals if they are well designed and properly implemented.

As they relate to limiting carbon emissions, market-based instruments can be grouped into three categories: government subsidies to clean energy generation, carbon taxes, and tradable carbon emissions permits or allowances. Consistent with the first approach, states have provided subsidies to zero or low-carbon power sources through renewable portfolio standards. RPSs require the increased production of energy from sources such as wind, solar, biomass, and geothermal. In practice, this has created an economic incentive to develop solar and wind projects in particular. Roughly half of all growth in U.S. renewable electricity generation and capacity since 2000 is associated with state RPS requirements. However, these systems can be complex and vary state by state. For example, 29 states use 10 different systems for accounting for RPSs, complicating trading across the country.

A subsidy through direct clean energy tax cuts, however, has never been implemented in any state or at the federal level. While tax credits for solar and wind investment and production are in place, they are scheduled to phase out over the next few years because these subsides were originally intended to help a nascent market get off the ground. Mature markets don’t need help from Uncle Sam. It’s possible to go further and pursue supply-side clean tax cuts. Basic logic dictates that if you want more of something, tax it less. Tax cuts linked to carbon emissions would put a price on carbon by rewarding capital flows to carbon-conserving solutions. This approach requires accounting for carbon reductions, monitoring, and enforcement.

The second type of market-based approach is a carbon tax, which would limit emissions by increasing business costs for carbon-intensive industries. In economic terms, the tax shifts the marginal private cost curve; it is a Pigouvian tax. While carbon taxes have been proposed in various formations at the state, regional (via PJM Interconnection), and federal level, to date no carbon taxes have been implemented in the United States. A key challenge is establishing the level. Any schedule for tax increases must be set by one-time legislation, since Congress will have a hard time adjusting the tax once it is established. The federal gas tax for highway funding — which hasn’t changed since 1993 — is an indication of how hard it is to adjust taxes once they have been established.

Setting the tax escalation rate depends on difficult-to-make assumptions about technological innovation over the period of the policy. If the tax is too high, a rapid shift in the energy market could displace workers and shock the economy. If the tax is too low, the policy won’t achieve emissions reductions goals. There are also major questions about what to do with the revenue collected from a carbon tax. Some have suggested carbon dividends, which would provide direct payments to Americans. But other carbon tax proposals would direct cuts to the corporate tax rate to assure revenue-neutrality and eliminate any additional government bureaucracy needed to administer the program and calculate dividends. However, an additional significant challenge is that a federal carbon tax would need to be wedded with the state-level efforts to decrease emissions through carbon trading.

Carbon trading — more formally tradable carbon emissions permits or allowances — is the third type of market-based approach. While in the halls of Congress, cap-and-trade has been out of favor for years, at the state-level this market-based approach has firmly taken root. Just last year, nine northeastern and mid-Atlantic states renewed their participation in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and California, America’s most populous state, extended its cap-and-trade system too. These are compliance-driven cap-and-trade markets. Businesses participate by buying a limited number of emissions allowances sold at auction or by trading unused credits among each other. Right now, nearly one-third of the U.S. economy is already under a compliance-based cap-and-trade program. RGGI states plus California make up 30 percent of our national gross domestic product. If Virginia and New Jersey join the initiative, as their governors anticipate, then over 35 percent of the U.S. economy will be within one of two cap-and-trade systems.

Concerns that a regional cap-and-trade system would create a costly bureaucracy and that markets could be manipulated have proved unfounded. RGGI held the program’s initial auction in September 2008 — the very same month the stock market crashed, bringing on the Great Recession. The RGGI model focused on accountability and transparency, and carbon prices have been lower than expected and the auctions and trades worked as planned. The long-term commitment to RGGI provided enough business certainty for industry to justify investing in clean energy resources, research and development, and updated infrastructure.

The results speak for themselves. Since RGGI was established in 2005, carbon dioxide emissions are down 45 percent and ratepayers have saved billions on their utility bills. The new goal agreed to in 2017 is to reduce the carbon emissions cap by another 30 percent between 2020 and 2030.

This growth is important because cap-and-trade systems become more economically efficient with more states and businesses participating. Larger carbon markets with more competition and options help keep the costs of compliance down.

A voluntary reporting and offset exchange system could make sense of the myriad approaches by states and the private sector by consolidating data and making it more publicly accessible. The benefit to opting into a voluntary system is federal assurance of full public disclosure. A limited federal effort could help protect investors and maintain fair and orderly functioning of voluntary carbon markets. State-level compliance markets would still need their own enforcement mechanisms. But for private actors in the voluntary space, the federal stamp of recognition could crowd-in investment. Perhaps most importantly, a voluntary greenhouse gas emissions registry and standards for carbon offsets will not invent a new federal system that attempts to supersede state progress.

Establishing consistent rules for measurement and exchange could be the missing piece to magnify the impact of the free enterprise system and avoid the legal challenges certain to continue following the Clean Power Plan and its proposed replacement.

Last August, EPA proposed the next regulatory steps to limit carbon emissions from existing power plants. To avoid lawsuits, the Trump administration’s final Affordable Clean Energy rule must both stay within the limitations of the Clean Air Act as defined by Congress and must be responsive to the Environmental Protection Agency’s 2009 endangerment finding. EPA’s approach is constrained by CAA Section 111(a)(1). This part of the law limits the scope of regulation to technologies that can be applied to a single stationary source — the power plant. This is also known as an inside the fence approach that regulates each power plant and smokestack individually. EPA’s mandate under Section 111(d) is limited to writing guidelines for states, so that state-level plans can be approved by the federal government. To inform this guidance, EPA’s rule will focus on the definition of a standard of performance or Best System of Emission Reduction. In other words, how much can emissions be reduced with an acceptable level of financial strain on the power plant?

This type of technology- and performance-based standard is classic command-and-control policymaking. These standards prescribe uniform requirements allowing relatively little flexibility in terms of how goals will be achieved. Although standards may be effective, forcing all businesses to resort to equally expensive means of controlling pollution can lead to relatively high total compliance costs. Because the costs of controlling emissions may vary greatly among power plants, and even among sources within a single plant, the appropriate technology in one situation may not be cost-effective in another. Control costs can vary enormously due to production design, physical configuration, age of assets, or other factors.

Experts say it is not entirely clear how much more can be done to improve coal plant efficiency, at least not without dramatically raising plants’ costs. For example, heat rate improvements were one of the proposed emission-reduction strategies described in the final version of the Obama CPP; but even regional targets may prove too costly to achieve. Plant-by-plant emissions targets are possible but represent a very heavy-handed approach.

A narrow reading of the act and an inside-the- fence power plant standard of performance is sound from a legal and technical standpoint, but it’s not the most cost-effective means for precise emissions reductions. Indeed, it risks ignoring a decade of policy leadership and capital investment by states and businesses. It could bring us back to command-and-control methods for reducing pollution. Only allowing reductions to occur within the fence is unnecessarily narrow. Carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are global pollutants. From a global climate change viewpoint, reducing emissions at the power plant is the same as reducing emissions anywhere else. In other words, as far as carbon in the atmosphere goes, avoiding a ton of emission from a power plant is the same as sequestering a ton of carbon through a forestry project. That’s why market-based approaches make the most sense for carbon.

Considering the opportunity for offsets and the use of compliance-based cap-and-trade by 10 states, EPA should focus on creating a flexible approach to limiting carbon. States possess — and must be guaranteed — considerable flexibility in developing their plans. EPA should create options for limiting emissions reductions inside the fence and establish a mechanism for purchasing verified offsets outside the fence. Furthermore, allowing for a broad definition of how the cost calculations can be developed may allow third-party investment via offsets or green bonds to minimize costs to ratepayers. This represents a key opportunity for enabling carbon capture and storage. CCS involves turning the smokestack on a power plant upside down so that emissions are stored underground instead of released into the atmosphere. While there are numerous geologic conditions that need to be just right, the technology exists and works but thus far isn’t cost effective outside of enhanced oil recovery operations.

Establishing consistent rules for measurement and exchange will make market-based solutions more transparent and unleash the free enterprise system to achieve emissions reductions goals. A voluntary greenhouse gas emissions registry and guidelines for the exchange of carbon offset credits will help raise the profile of existing voluntary actions that take place absent government regulation and help crowd in investment. The federal government should encourage buyers in this market motivated by self-defined environmental goals and sellers motivated by environmental interests and economic gain.

Several certification processes and non-governmental organizations verify offsets. Demand has been consistent for years. But the market could be bigger and offsets could play a larger role in driving down emissions if offsets were allowed by EPA’s new rule. Allowing offsets would create technical options for minimizing the cost of carbon emissions reductions.

An era with blossoming financial instruments, multiple means of measurement, and poor market coordination is not unprecedented. Before the stock market crash of 1929, most investors gave little thought to the systemic risk that arose from poor information and the need for basic market rules. The crash was a devastating way to learn a lesson about the need to protect investors and maintain orderly, functioning markets. Out of the ashes, the Securities and Exchange Commission was established to protect investors and markets and to facilitate capital formation. The result has been an economy that remains the envy of the world. With a plethora of market-based approaches being implemented to limit carbon across the United States, a similar approach based on coordination and protection could be helpful to meet today’s challenges.

By establishing a voluntary federal greenhouse gas emissions registry and a system for the voluntary exchange of carbon offset credits, the federal government won’t dictate how carbon emissions will be reduced. It will establish a reliable economic and environmental framework that could help unleash the market’s potential to solve the problem. By promoting public disclosure and a common accounting system for carbon trades, private and public actors at all levels will get credit for emissions reductions that are already taking place. And there will be a bigger spotlight on those actors who are leading emissions reductions. Improved information and clear market signals will help guide finance, including green bonds, to clean energy. The result could be very powerful. And make the United States’ market-based approach the model for how to solve the climate change problem. TEF

CENTERPIECE ❧ Establishing a nationwide system for carbon reporting and an offset exchange will empower states, municipalities, and businesses to decrease emissions while increasing investment in clean energy and improving transparency and accountability.

The Debate: Is Manufacturing Products for Export to the West Compromising Environmental Health in China?
Author
Joseph E. Aldy - Harvard Kennedy School of Government
Joel P. Trachtman - Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Jennifer L. Turner - Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars
Leo W. Gerard - United Steel Workers Union
Zhao Huiyu - Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Harvard Kennedy School of Government
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars
United Steel Workers Union
Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Current Issue
Issue
5
The Debate: Is Manufacturing Products for Export to the West Compromising Enviro

The respected New Scientist magazine interprets new data published in Nature on the mortality impacts from manufacturing and international trade and concludes that more than 100,000 people die every year as a result of the noxious emissions caused by making China’s exports to the United States and Western Europe. We asked an expert panel for their views on this hypothesis.

The potential for environmental regulations to weaken the competitiveness of domestic manufacturing has played a role in policy debates since the emergence of modern environmental legislation in the 1970s. These competitiveness concerns reflect the so-called “pollution haven” hypothesis that suggests that firms relocate economic activity from places with high regulatory costs to those with lower costs. There are other competitiveness factors affecting plant location as well, and these include access to skilled labor, energy, and natural resources as well as industrial policies in exporting countries that promote manufacturing.

For local pollutants, such as ozone and fine particulate air pollution, adverse competitiveness effects would result in better air quality in the United States at the expense of jobs and manufacturing output. At the same time, “In our global economy, the goods and services consumed in one region may entail production of large quantities of air pollution — and related mortality — in other regions,” according to Nature.

“If the cost of imported products is lower because of less stringent air pollution controls in the regions where they are produced, then the consumer savings may come at the expense of lives lost elsewhere,” the study authors say. “There is some evidence that the polluting industries have tended to migrate to regions with more permissive environmental regulations . . . suggesting that there may be tension between efforts to improve air quality in a given region and to attract direct foreign investment.”

Study co-author Steven Davis of the University of California says the West can no longer point fingers at emerging economies for lax controls when access to cheaper goods serves as a driver of polluting behavior. By the same token, most observers would agree that Beijing in the last few years has made impressive strides in imposing new pollution legislation and implementing rules and in empowering its environmental agencies and NGOs.

We ask our expert panel, Have we substantiated the pollution-haven hypothesis? Are people in countries such as China suffering in support of western lifestyles? What can be done to mitigate the mortality and other health and environmental effects of international trade on manufacturing economies?

As always, we remind readers that the opinions of these Debaters are not necessarily those of the Environmental Law Institute or its funders.

Is Manufacturing Products for Export to the West Compromising Environmental Health in China?

ELI Report
Author
Laura Frederick - Environmental Law Institute
Environmental Law Institute
Current Issue
Issue
5

Now in their 29th year, ELI’s National Wetland Awards are presented to individuals who have excelled in wetlands protection, restoration, and education.

“These men and women are on the forefront of protecting wetland resources in the face of development and climate impacts,” said ELI President Scott Fulton. “Through their dedication and achievements, they inspire wetlands protection across the country and worldwide.”

The ceremony kicked off with a keynote speech from Leah Krider, senior counsel, environment, health, and safety, at the Boeing Company, who described its expansion and mitigation efforts in South Carolina.

“Conservation and economic growth are not mutually exclusive. Conservation is not only good for the environment, for the communities. It makes good economic sense,” Krider said.

Awardees were recognized for their individual achievements in six categories:

Landowner Stewardship: For 28 years, William and Jeanette Gibbons and their family have devoted their time and financial resources to restoring degraded land and water on their property at Cedar Breaks Ranch in Brookings, South Dakota. They developed their property into a showcase of how various conservation practices can be seamlessly and profitably integrated into a working farm. They also use their land to further research and education on natural resource management approaches.

Science Research: Kerstin Wasson is the research coordinator at the Elkhorn Slough National Estuarine Research Reserve in Watsonville, California. She engages citizen scientists in collecting water quality data and counting migratory shorebirds. She launched an ecosystem-based management initiative that brought together stakeholders to develop a shared vision for restoration of the estuary’s wetlands. Kerstin has led collaborative projects across the network of National Estuarine Reserves.

Education and Outreach: Mark D. Sees has served as the manager of Florida’s Orlando Wetlands Park for over 20 years. In addition to managing the wetland treatment system, he has evolved the park into a center of public recreation and wetlands education and research. He initiated the annual Orlando Wetlands Festival to provide 5,000 local children and adults an opportunity to tour the wetlands to understand their ecological importance.

State, Tribal, and Local Program Development: Maryann M. McGraw, wetland program coordinator for the New Mexico Environment Department, initiated the state’s wetlands program and continues to provide vision and guidance to ensure the program reflects the importance of wetlands and riparian areas in the arid west. She developed rapid assessment methods for montane and lowland riverine wetlands, confined valleys, and playas of the Southern High Plains, which provides data needed to underscore state wetlands water quality standards and anti-degradation policies.

Conservation and Restoration: Latimore M. Smith is a retired restoration ecologist with The Nature Conservancy in Covington, Louisiana. A botanist and plant community ecologist, he spent over 15 years with the Louisiana Natural Heritage Program, documenting the ecology of habitats across the state. He was the first to formally describe a variety of previously undocumented natural wetland communities, including rare longleaf pine flatwood wetlands.

Wetlands Business Leader: Roy R. “Robin” Lewis III of Salt Springs, Florida, was the winner of this new award. For more than four decades, Lewis has been at the vanguard of wetland restoration and creation, designing or assisting in the design of over 200 projects around the world. He founded two environmental consulting companies and is president of Coastal Resource Group, Inc., a nonprofit educational and scientific organization. He also works with the Association of State Wetland Managers to provide education opportunities and resources.

Ramsar Convention event presages 13th conference of parties

Before the 29th Annual National Wetlands Awards ceremony — see facing page — ELI hosted a panel discussion on the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance.

The treaty calls attention to the rate at which wetland habitats are disappearing, in part due to a lack of understanding of their importance. The convention provides an international framework for action and cooperation to promote “the conservation and wise use of all wetlands through local and national actions and international cooperation.”

The United States became a party to the convention in 1986 and has since designated 38 sites covering 4.5 million acres nationwide.

Attendees of the program, An Introduction to the Ramsar Convention, learned about efforts at the local, national, and international level to implement the accord.

Panelists included Cade London, Fish and Wildlife Service; Maryann M. McGraw, New Mexico Environment Department; and Barbara De Rosa-Joynt of the State Department.

After receiving an overview of the evolution of the convention and insight into the international community, the audience heard about the primary goals of Ramsar at the domestic level.

The convention covers a broad range of ecosystems considered as natural and man-made. The final presentation focused on one Ramsar site in New Mexico. The Roswell Artesian Wetlands is a desert ecosystem made up of a complex of springs, lakes, sinkholes and saline wetlands situated along the Pecos River. These wetlands support over 360 species of waterfowl as well as other animals and plants, including a number of rare, endemic, and endangered species.

As panelist De Rosa-Joynt explained, wetlands knowledge and science is consistently evolving and informing the future goals of the convention.

The 13th conference of the parties will be held this fall in Dubai. Themed “Wetlands for a Sustainable Urban Future,” the conference is expected to draw over 1,200 representatives from the parties. On the agenda are climate change; agriculture; so-called “blue carbon”; and polar wetlands.

Aiding China in coming to grips with country’s excessive pollution

In March, ELI, with the assistance of the Pillsbury law firm, prepared a report, Managing Environmental Protection and Economic Considerations Under Select U.S. Environmental Laws and Permitting Systems, for China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection. The study explains how the United States has balanced economic considerations and environmental protection through the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Endangered Species Act.

ELI and the China Environmental Protection Foundation then held capacity building workshops at the Tianjin University Law School on environmental public interest litigation. While the focus was on participation of Chinese NGOs, other entities involved included Supreme People’s Court judges and prosecutors from the Supreme People’s Procuratorate.

Reforms to China’s Environmental Protection Law establish authorities for the government and the public alike, with the added ability of authorized civil society groups to file citizen suits. However, the success of these improved systems relies on a multifaceted system of accountability, with both the government and civil society playing roles. ELI is providing technical assistance, capacity building, and legal training to NGOs that have been approved by the civil authorities to engage in civil environmental litigation.

ELI staff attorney Zhuoshi Liu has been a leader in this public interest environmental litigation capacity building work, and in developing and hosting the workshops. A China native, Liu brings a wealth of knowledge to ELI’s China Program and the Institute as a whole.

Participants also benefitted from the expertise of ELI faculty from the Institute’s extended community.

Jeff Gracer of Sive, Paget & Riesel P.C., a member of ELI’s Leadership Council, traveled to China for January’s conference. The conferences included presentations from Leadership Council members Robert (Buzz) Hines of Farella Braun + Martel LLP, and former ELI President Leslie Carothers as well as longtime member Dan Guttman of New York University Shanghai.

Field Notes: ELI on the scene in flooded Ohio, polluted Gulf

In summer 2017, ELI Senior Science and Policy Analyst, Rebecca Kihslinger, and ELI’s partners at the University of North Carolina’s Institute for the Environment, traveled to Ottawa, Ohio, where state and village officials and residents and business owners came together to brainstorm on uses for flood buyout properties during the Making the Most of Ottawa’s Floodplain Buyouts Workshop.

Ottawa had purchased 55 floodplain properties since 2008, totaling 25 acres, using funding from government grants, Hazard Mitigation Grants, and Hazard Mitigation Assistance grants. Recently, the Federal Emergency Management Agency approved the first of three major projects planned to utilize these buyout properties by the Greenspace Development Committee. A once vacant lot will become Rex Center Park.

In continuation of ELI’s work in the Gulf of Mexico since the BP oil spill eight years ago, ELI traveled to Gulfport, Mississippi, to encourage public engagement efforts. To help members of the public better understand how to get involved, ELI, along with Environmental Management Services, Mississippi Commercial Fisheries United, and Public Lab, co-sponsored an event on Engaging in the Gulf Restoration Processes: How the Public Can Help Shape Restoration. The goal of this event was to provide participants with tools and information that they can use to more effectively take part in and understand the restoration and recovery efforts.

On April 16, ELI and co-sponsors convened a panel of environmental justice leaders, including keynote speaker Rep. Raul Ruiz, co-author of the proposed Environmental Justice Act of 2017.

Continuing discussions from a panel held last November, speakers explored climate justice, siting issues, ramifications of extreme weather events on marginalized communities, and ways in which practitioners can empower and support environmental justice communities through their own work.

A networking reception followed to further conversation and discussion of key topics at the forefront of environmental justice. On display was the newly released book from ELI Press Environmental Justice: Legal Theory and Practice, 4th Edition.

After announcing his $1.5 trillion infrastructure plan, President Trump has sought to streamline and expedite the environmental review and permitting process for projects under multiple environmental laws, ranging from the National Environmental Policy Act, Endangered Species Act, and Migratory Bird Treaty Act to the Clean Air and Clean Water acts.

Trump submitted to Congress an ambitious legislative “roadmap,” which proposes a number of far-reaching changes to the environmental review framework with a goal of shortening the process for approving projects to two years or less.

To examine these developments ELI and Arnold & Porter cohosted a conference entitled Infrastructure Review and Permitting: Is Change in the Wind? High-level government officials, practitioners representing industry and environmental NGOs, and congressional representatives were present to address the wide range of environmental permitting and review challenges across sectors, including transportation, energy, transmission, renewables, and more.

Panelists discussed the role of policy and litigation in shaping these developments over the next years and beyond.

Latest flock of National Wetlands Awards winners.