With the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2025-2026 term having ended just last month, it is time to look at how these cases might shape environmental policy and protection in years to come. Among the “environmental” cases on the docket this past year were two that impact our day-to-day life: pesticides and energy efficiency.
In the pesticide case, Monsanto v. Durnell, an individual filed suit in Missouri state court arguing that Roundup, a glyphosate-based pesticide, causes cancer and should therefore include a cancer warning on its label. The Court disagreed, ruling that FIFRA preempts the state court action. Under FIFRA, states may not impose labeling requirements “in addition to or different from those required under” the statute to ensure uniformity across the country. The statute also puts EPA in charge of monitoring pesticide safety and imposing labeling requirements. Because EPA does not require a cancer warning, the Court reasoned that a state court likewise could not require a cancer warning under the federal statute. Justices Ketanji Jackson and Neil Gorsuch dissented on the grounds that FIFRA’s labeling requirement was equivalent to the individual’s state-level failure-to-warn claim: both require necessary and adequate warnings for chronic risks. As for the EPA labeling claim, the dissenting Justices would have held that because EPA’s warnings do not address chronic cancer risks, FIFRA wouldn’t preempt the state case.
In the energy efficiency case, American Gas Association v. Department of Energy, the Court vacated a lower court order upholding efficiency regulations for commercial water heaters and residential and mobile-home gas furnaces. DOE had successfully defended its standards during the Biden Administration, but on appeal to the Supreme Court, the Trump Administration changed course and asked that the lower court decision be vacated. The new administration agreed with petitioners that the efficiency standards rested on a “flawed reading” of the Energy Policy Conservation Act and illegally required companies to phase out certain appliances that could not satisfy the new standard. Considering the government’s change in position, the Court agreed to vacate and remand the case for reconsideration. DOE has yet to announce an actual rollback of those standards, but by vacating the lower court decision, the Court may have helped ease the path for that rollback since DOE no longer has to argue around a court decision that upheld the Biden-era rule.
The Court also decided two procedural questions in cases about oil and gas development. In Enbridge Energy LP v. Nessel, the Michigan Attorney General filed suit against an energy company that operates an oil pipeline through the Straits of Mackinac, a waterway connecting Michigan’s Lower and Upper Peninsulas. The company sought to “remove” the case to federal court, where presumably it would have a better chance of defending itself. But the company missed the statutory deadline for removing the case to federal court by more than 800 days. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the deadline cannot be tolled and that the case must remain in state court.
Conversely, in the other oil and gas case, Chevron v. Plaquemines Parish, the Court unanimously granted energy companies’ request to remove a state case filed against them to federal court. The case was filed by a number of Louisiana parishes who alleged that the companies’ production activities were damaging Louisiana’s coastline. Under the federal officer removal statute, if a defendant’s work sufficiently “relates to” work for the federal government, the defendant can remove the case to federal court and defend itself there. Here, the damages related to aviation gas production during World War II, and one of the companies’ predecessors produced that gas in support of the government’s war effort. The Court held this was sufficient for the removal statute to apply, but it clarified that defendants cannot remove “all suits with any attenuated connection to federal duties.” For example, the Court explained that false advertising claims that target an oil company’s statements about the “future effects of fossil fuels on climate” are not sufficiently related to gas production for the federal government. The question about federal work likely will come up in future environmental cases.
The Court also addressed presidential power this past term, which will likely have a long-term effect on environmental protection. For example, the Court issued two decisions on “independent” agencies—federal agencies that Congress created with removal protections for the agency’s leaders. In Trump v. Slaughter, the Court addressed whether congressional limits on firing commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission were constitutional. In an opinion that divided along partisan lines, the Court held that FTC’s for-cause removal provision violates the separation-of-powers doctrine, reasoning that removal limits lead to “subservience to congressional direction” in violation of Article II. According to the majority, after “foisting” the agency onto the President by requiring him to appoint the heads, Congress may not enhance its own power by depriving the president of removal powers.
There is a vigorous debate about whether Trump v. Slaughter got the history right. Nevertheless, if removal limits at other agencies are ever litigated, Trump v. Slaughter will make it difficult to uphold them. This could affect decisionmaking at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission—an independent agency charged with overseeing transmission and sale of electricity—and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission—an independent agency charged with deep safety concerns.
Perhaps, curiously, the Court did enforce removal protections that Congress put in place for the board of the Federal Reserve in Trump v. Cook. Here, the president wanted to remove a board member before their term expired, but a district court preliminarily enjoined her removal. An appellate court denied the government’s request to lift the stay, as did the Supreme Court. Here, accepting the government’s view would, in effect, transform the Federal Reserve’s “for-cause protection into at-will employment” contrary to congressional intent. The Court also pointed to the agency’s “unique historical status and role” and explained that “calamities could arise” if there was even a suspicion that the president was manipulating monetary policy.
The Court heard other cases about the president’s power to fire agency personnel and to cut funding, all of which have their own ramifications for policy more broadly. For example, the Court allowed drastic funding cuts that hampered agency work and priorities in Department of State v. AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition. This case falls on the heels of last term’s McMahon v. New York, where the Court allowed the president to fire half of the Department of Education in a plan to “facilitate the closure” of the agency, and National Institutes of Health v. American Public Health Association, in which the Court allowed the National Institutes of Health to cancel thousands of research grants (and the subject of my February column).
As with last year’s Supreme Court docket, the overall legal landscape is shifting dramatically, with implications for environmental law and beyond. Time will tell what and how the Court decides its 2026-2027 term.
Questions or comments? Email us at [email protected]. The views and opinions expressed in the Environmental Forum are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of ELI.